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INTRODUCTION

As the quantity and scope of federal funding to public and private
grantees has grown over the past decades,' programs implicating the
constitutional rights of grant recipients have increasingly become the
subject of controversy.' In the arts, such controversy has encom1. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. TransitAuth., 469 U.S. 528, 552-53 (1985) (referring
to Department of Treasury and Bureau of Census federal expenditure reports). Annual federal
subsidies to state and municipal governments increased from approximately $7 billion in 1960
to $96 billion in 1985. Id. These figures would, of course, be larger if grants to private
individuals, businesses, nonprofit charities, service organizations, and universities were included.
Additional governmental support, in the form of tax abatements or exemptions, constitutes an
indirect but substantial subsidy. Although more difficult to calculate, such tax relief to the nonprofit sector alone amounts to many billions of dollars annually. For example, in 1984, private
charitable contributions amounted to $73.3 billion. If taxed as income at a low rate of 15%, the
revenue gained by the IRS would amount to almost $11 billion. SeeBRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW
OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 3-22 (4th ed. 1993) (updating current IRS regulations, court
decisions, public and private letter rulings); Boris Bittker & George Rahdert, The Exemption of
Nonprofit OrganizationsfromFederalIncomeTaxation, 85YALE LJ. 299,301 (1976) (studying federal

tax status of public service and mutual benefit organizations, including social clubs, cooperatives,
unions, and business leagues); Richard Gershon, Tax Exempt Entities: Achieving and Maintaining
Special Status Under the Watchful Eye of the InternalRevenue Service, 16 CuMB. L. REV. 301, 326
(1986) (examining types of organizations granted tax exempt status, IRS procedures, and their
underlyingjustifications). See generally GILBERT M. GAUL & NEIL A. BOROWSKI, FREE RIDE: THE

TAX-EXEMPT ECONOMY (1993) (critiquing tax exempt status of nonprofit organizations in
American economy). Since the mid-1980s, the level of governmental support for the nonprofit
sector has continued to grow, although at a somewhat slower pace. HOPKINS, supra, at 18-22.
See generally INDEPENDENT SEcTOR, APORTRAIT OF THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR (1993) (providing
lavish statistical profile of nonprofit sector of American economy).
2. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (health-care services); Finley v. National
Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (arts); Board of Trustees of Leland
StanfordJunior Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472 (D.D.C. 1991) (university science research);
see also infra notes 76-92 and accompanying text (discussing recent controversies surrounding
grant funding). Funding for scientific research, health care, and the arts has traditionally come
from private sources such as industry, private foundations, and individual benefactors. Such
private funding historically lay outside the reach of constitutional law and was legally subject to
the contractual rights of the parties. Government funding for these areas has undergone
profound growth in the past thirty years. Between World War II and the 1960s, government
support for scientific research, although substantial, was limited largely to defense-related
projects and subject to First Amendment restrictions based on the compelling need for secrecy
and national security. See, e.g., National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 496 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-432 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) (establishing controls over
government-sponsored national defense and security research); 42 U.S.C. § 1862 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993) (governing federal sponsorship of national security research through National Science
Foundation); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507,510-13 (1980) (upholding federal restrictions
on speech of former CIA agent for national security reasons).
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passed not only the general inappropriateness of government
subsidies, but more serious charges of abuse of government funding
by projects that have offended public standards of decency.' Both
Congress and administrative agencies have often come under heavy
pressure to restrict the use of government funding to avoid results
that offend public sensibilities.4 The arts and nonprofit communities
have fiercely resisted such restrictions, which they regard as unconstitutional restrictions on their freedom of self-expression.5 The debate
over restrictions on funding to the arts reached a climax immediately
following the Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Rust v. Sullivan.6 In
Rust, the Court held, inter alia, that the government could "refus[e]
to fund activities, including speech, which are specifically excluded
from the scope of the project funded."7 If limits on programmatic
funding did not single out a specific group for discrimination on the
basis of speech content, then the government was free to pursue its
goals within the scope of the project.8 Although Rust was primarily
concerned with restrictions placed on Federal Titie X funding for
family planning programs,9 its implications shook the confidence of
other government grant recipients, whose own ability to pursue work
unimpeded by governmental restrictions in areas previously secured

3. SeeJOHNW. ZEIGLER, ARTS IN Cisis 67-122 (1994) (discussing debate over controversial
art funded by Federal Government). Some of the most prominent controversies surrounding
government-funded arts projects included exhibitions "ofhomoerotic photographs by the late
Robert Mapplethorpe and of a photograph entitled "Piss Christ" by Andres Serrano in which a
crucifix is shown submerged in ajar of the artist's urine. Id. at 69, 73-74.
4. Congressional debate on the matter of restricting the content of artistic expression in
federally funded projects became particularly heated during the 1989 and 1990 re-authorization
hearings for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA). See Catherine R. Stimpson, The ArtsEndowment CrisisIs the Latest Encounterin the BattleBetween Freedomand Fear,HigherEducation Must
Join the Fray, CHRON.OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept 26, 1990, at B1 (reviewing re-authorization battle
over NEA and advocating that academe take stand against content restrictions in government
funding). The debate regularly resurfaces during the annual appropriation process for the NEA.
See infra note 90 and accompanying text (reviewing congressional concerns about NEA grants).
5. See Julie Alagna, 1991 Legislation, Reports and Debates over Federally Funded Arts: Arts
Community Left with an "Indecent" Compromie 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1545, 1577 (1991)
(criticizing 1991 congressional legislation implementing general decency standards for NEA
grants); infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (discussing legislative activities and tension
surrounding government subsidies of Arts).
6. 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding federal regulations prohibiting federal funding of
abortion counseling, referral, and advocacy).
7. Rust v.Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194-95 (1991).
8. Id. at 195 (noting that government may restrict conduct within project, so long as it
does not prohibit recipient from engaging in protected conduct outside scope of program).
9. See Family Planning and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-572, § 6(c),
84 Stat. 1506-08 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300(a-6) (1988 & Supp. V 1993))
(codifying ban on funding family planning programs that discuss abortion); 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.8
to .9 (1994) (requiring grantee to offer Title X family planning counseling in physically separate
facilities, with different personnel, and accounts maintained separately from any other
counseling services independently offered by grantee that referred to or suggested abortion as
alternative to child birth).
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under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions was no longer
clear.10
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that the
government may not allocate a benefit on the condition that the
beneficiary sacrifice a constitutional right, even if the government is
under no obligation to provide the proffered benefit." By upholding Title X regulations that effectively prohibited grant recipients
from discussing abortion as a reproductive option unless undertaken
in completely separate facilities, 2 the Court in Rust cast doubt on
the extent of the doctrine's protection. The Court's holding is
especially troubling to nonprofit service organizations that depend on
federal and state grants to support substantial portions of their
programs. Organizations that provide controversial or unpopular
services as part of their programs are especially vulnerable to funding
conditions; such conditions would implicitly restrain constitutionally
protected activities that are privately funded as well as actions
reasonably taken within the scope of the government program.' 3 At

10. But see Hearingon the First Amendment Implications of the Rust v. Sullivan Decision Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1991)

(statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Leslie Southwick) (noting that Rust decision
.merely recognizes that when the government sponsors speech for certain purposes, it has the
right to regulate the content of the government-funded portion of the message"). In her
testimony, Ms. Southwick also noted that "when the government funds a certain view, the
government is itself speaking... and need not fund viewpoints with which it disagrees." Id. at
10-11.
11. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1413, 1415
(1989) (explaining doctrine of unconstitutional conditions); see also RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN,
BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 307-08, 312 (1993) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE
STATE] (alleging that government has unfair advantage in bargaining with parties who receive
benefits, and may unfairly impose conditions); David Cole, Beyond UnconstitutionalConditions:
ChartingSpheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675, 675 (1992)

(arguing that government-funded clinics and art programs are within same category of protected
speech as public universities and press); Richard A. Epstein, UnconstitutionalConditions, State
Power, and the Limits of ConsenA 102 HARV. L. REV.4, 102-04 (1988) (arguing thatjudiciary should
protect economic liberty); Lewis B. Kaden, Politics,Money, and State Sovereignty: TheJudicialRole,

79 COLUM. L. REv. 847, 849 (1979) (contending thatjudiciary is most effective protector of state
sovereignty); AlbertJ. Rosenthal, ConditionalFederalSpending and the Constitution,39 STAN. L. REV.

1103, 1109-10, 1125 (1987) (exploring whether Congress could lawfully regulate matters beyond
its power to legislate by attaching conditions to expenditures); ef. Cass L Sunstein, Why the
UnconstitutionalConditionsDoctrine Is an Anachronism (With ParticularReference to Religion, Speech,
and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REv. 593, 595 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, UnconstitutionalConditions

DoctrineIs an Anachronism] (rejecting traditional doctrine and proposing to examine whether
government has "constitutionally sufficient justification" for interfering with protected right);
Cass R.Sunstein, Is There an UnconstitutionalConditionsDoctrine?,26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 337, 338
(1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, UnconstitutionalConditionsDoctrine] (arguing that focus of inquiry
should be whether condition hurts protected interest in "constitutionally troublesome way").
12. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196-97 (noting that merely requiring Tide X recipients to conduct
abortion advocacy in separate facilities burdens no constitutional right).
13. In fact, government-funded project grants to most nonprofit organizations are
predicated on the grantee receiving matching funds from private sources. See, e.g.,20 U.S.C.
§ 954(e) (1994) (limiting NEA grants to 20% of total cost of project or production); 45 C.rFtR
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stake is the freedom of nonprofit organizations to remain faithful to
their own institutional mandates while meeting governmental

requirements that might curtail their primary interests.
With the convergence of congressional debate over federal funding
policies for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA)1 4 and the
Supreme Court's decision in Rust, the issue of unconstitutional
conditions and governmental grants to nonprofit organizations has

reached a crossroads. In the balance is the relative freedom that
nonprofit organizations previously asserted while administering

federal grants and the prospect of significantly increased governmental control over the operation of the arts organization or individual

who accepts government funding. 5 At issue is whether proactive
restrictions on the use of government funds will have a chilling effect
on the work of artists and organizations, either by discouraging them

from soliciting and accepting government funding,16 thus reducing
their resources to act, or by curtailing the artistic freedom within

which funding recipients ordinarily pursue their objectives. To the

§ 1100.1 (b) (1994) (requiring arts organizations to obtain matching private grants of private
funds in ratio no less than two private dollars to one federal dollar for project budget). A
restriction on government funds would, of course, extend to the use of private funds within the
project as well. See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 199 n.5 (stating that "[b]y accepting Title X funds, a
recipient voluntarily consents to any restrictions placed on any matching funds or grant-related
income"). In circumstances where governmental funding is allocated for general use but is
proportionately small and impossible to segregate from other sources of funding, restrictions
that may impede the use of private funding are invalid. See FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364, 400-01 (1984) (holding bar on noncommercial educational broadcasting station
editorializing unconstitutional where government funding comprised 1% of budget).
14. See 136 CONG. REc. S16,626 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Helms)
(proposing amendment to bill, H.R. 5769, that no NEA funding support obscene materials).
Notably, conservative members of Congress called for the restriction or elimination of public
funding for arts projects that produce "obscene materials" and for other activities or works that
display a disdain for the "moral and religious sensibility of the majority of the American people."
Id. Pressure to restrict funding for the arts has continued in the aftermath of the 1994 mid-term
elections. See Art Solicitors Go on the Offensive, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 15, 1995, at A18; Congress:
Back to the Trenches; BUS. WL, Sept. 18, 1995, at 42.
15. See Michael J. Elston, Artists and UnconstitutionalConditions: The Big Bad Wolf Won't
Subsidize Little Red Riding Hood's Indecent Art, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 327, 329-31 (1993)
(reviewing potential effects of recent government attempts to restrict content of arts projects).
16. Many organizations have protested such restrictive conditions by refusing to accept
future funding or returning grants already received. The American Poetry Review, The ParisReview,
and The Boston Review all rejected NEA grants. ZEIGLER, supra note 3, at 114-18. Joseph Papp,
Director of the New York Shakespeare Festival, also refused to accept NEA monies, denouncing
the Endowment's restrictions and new procedures as "a kind of cultural vice squad." William
A. Henry III, Are Artists Godless Perverts? In the Battle over Public Funding, Opponents Seem to Be
Winning, TIME, Sept. 10, 1990, at 81; see also ZEIGLER, supranote 3, at 114-18 (discussing NEA's
position against content restrictions and artists refusals to accept grants based on content restrictions).
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arts community, and to a considerable proportion of the public at
large, neither choice is attractive."
The Court's decision in Rust has also fueled a growing debate over
the authority of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and its
appropriateness as a guide for judicial oversight of funding restrictions in governmental programs. 8 What is needed is an alternative
constitutional theory that will more predictably determine the
boundaries of political control over funding programs. It is imperative that such a new approach reconcile traditional political and social
values while preserving fundamental rights of expression. This
alternative theory must also answer the familiar regulatory argument
that the government's "greater power" to deny funding for a good
reason encompasses the "lesser power" to condition funding for the
same reason, 19 an argument which underscores many of the infirmities of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.2" A middle ground is necessary in the doctrinal conflict between
constitutional theories that require absolute protection of the
expressive rights of grant recipients and those approaches that permit
unfettered governmental regulation of a grantee's expression within

17. See Tom Mathews, FineArts or Foul? In Galleries, Theaters, Congress and the Courts, a Battle
overFreedomofExpessionIs Raging,NEWSWEEKJuly 2, 1990, at 46,50. At the height of the debate
over restrictions on federally funded arts projects, a Gallup Organization poll showed that 75%
of the respondents felt that it was more important for individuals to have the right to determine
what they may see or hear, than to allow society to impose laws prohibiting "material offensive
to some segments of the community." Id. When asked whether federal officials or an
independent panel of established art experts should exercise control over federally funded arts
projects, 63% preferred the experts and only 30% responded that more official control was
necessary. Id.
18. Although attractive in theory and well established in legal scholarship, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions has been under attack for some time. The chief complaint of its
critics arises from the doctrine's failure to guide court decisions with any consistency. See
Sunstein, UnconstitutionalConditionsDoctrine,supranote 11, at 344-45 (criticizing unconstitutional
conditions doctrine for being overbroad and ignoring particular circumstances of cases); see also
infranotes 197-250 and accompanying text (discussing weaknesses of unconstitutional conditions
doctrine and alternate doctrines); cf. Cole, supranote 11, at 694-97 (arguing that doctrine is
consistent, but noting that courts have only addressed legitimacy of restrictions within confines
of grant, not restrictions extending beyond it).
19. Robert L. Hale, UnconstitutionalConditions and ConstitutionalRights, 35 CoLUM. L. REV.
321, 350-52 (1935) (contending that courts should consider whether condition is germane to
regulation's purpose); see infranote 100 (citing examples of regulatory argument).
20. Justice Holmes dismissed the entire doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as a logical
and conceptual error. "Even in the law the whole may generally include its parts. If the State
may prohibit, it may prohibit with the privilege of avoiding the prohibition in a certain way."
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910) (Holmes,J., dissenting). Later in his
career, Justice Holmes softened his view of the government's privilege to regulate. He
acknowledged the duty of government to respect the freedoms declared in the Bill of Rights,
notwithstanding its discretionary power to participate in many areas of economic and private life:
"The United States may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use
of the malls is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues." Milwaukee
Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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the scope of a funded program. In Rust, the Supreme Court offered,
in dicta, a solution to this dilemma when it explained that within
certain "traditional spheres of free expression," government-funded
projects might well be protected from any restrictions that would
curtail recipients' exercise of fundamental rights, even within the
narrow scope of the project itself." The Court used the ,example of
the university, which is "so fundamental to the functioning of our2
society," as one such traditionally protected sphere of discourse.
In light of increasing concern among legislators and policy commentators that the government should be much more vigilant in its
oversight and control over funding for arts projects that might be
deemed blasphemous or offensive to community standards of
decency,23 the question naturally arises whether the arts are similarly
protected as a traditional sphere of free expression.
This Article explores the issue of governmental funding to the arts
and the constitutional limits on how severely the government may
restrict the activity of a recipient. Part I briefly reviews the history of
government support of the arts, especially as it has developed since
the New Deal. Part II considers the paradox of governmental funding
for the arts: the desire to nurture and yet maintain some control over
the results of the artistic activity. Part II further discusses the
conflicting nature of governmental funding, whether as a discretionary benefit or as an entitlement, in light of the constitutional
background of governmental funding restrictions prior to the Rust
decision.
Part III examines specific aspects of funded "speech" activity in the
arts. Elements of speech such as the location or medium of its
expression, content, subject matter, viewpoint, artistic merit, as well
as obscenity are discussed in view of the special symbolic values
accorded the arts as a recipient of government support. In this
context, the Article explores whether the arts constitute a traditional
sphere of protected speech within constitutional jurisprudence in
light of the Rust decision. The Article concludes that under conventional time, place, and manner limitations, the arts are a traditional
sphere of public discourse and, therefore, subject to the protection of
the First Amendment.

21. Rust, 500 U.S. at 200 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06
(1967)).
22. I&
23. See, e.g., 136 GONG. REC. S16,626 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Helms)
(arguing that federal government should stop funding offensive art).
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Part IV presents four policy options that address the dilemma of the
government's wish to promote the arts while maintaining some
control over the artistic products of its largesse. This Article proposes
finally that the government focus its funding efforts on programs that
nurture a national arts infrastructure. This goal could be accomplished primarily through the promotion and support of state and
private arts organizations, rather than by grants to individual artists.
While such a proposal still leaves the government open to criticism for
indirectly supporting controversial projects that it once may have
supported directly, it removes the government's burden and responsibility of directly administering the individual work of the artist. At the
same time, this proposal allows the government to fund directly those
organizations and programs that are in the best position to promote
art, artists, and their audiences on a national basis.
The Article cautions that continued political support for the arts
will depend increasingly on the development of a legislative strategy
aimed at selectively funding those programs in the arts that meet
Congress' mandate to promote the arts but avoid unsettling controversies over the artistic results. In the end, the choice to fund the arts
is a political decision. Curtailing support is also political, irrespective
of the fact that judicially secured rights to freedom of artistic
expression exist. Congress will not fund the arts unless there is a
broad consensus to do so.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING OF THE ARTS
A.

Support for the Arts Before 1965

Governmental interest in artistic enterprises is as old as the
nation.24 Before moving the capital to the District of Columbia, the
Federal Government spent considerable energy and funds commissioning Pierre L'Enfant to create a plan for the new capital city, which
included erecting major buildings and monuments.25 After specifying the general spirit and thrust of the project, President Washington

24. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 545 (1941) (surveying right
of free speech from nation's founding). In a declaration issued in 1774, the first Continental
Congress stated that basic freedom would include "the advancement of truth, science, morality
and the arts in general." Id.
25.

See HANS PAUL CAEMMERER, THE LIFE OF PIERRE CHARLES L'ENFANT, PLANNER OF THE

CITY BEAUTIFUL, THE CITY OFWASHINGTON 127-38(1950) (discussingplanningofcapital city and
debate over its location). See generally ELIZABETH S. KITE, L'ENFANT AND WASHINGTON (1970)
(discussing life of L'Enfant and providing excerpts of letters between L'Enfant and government); THE BRITANNICA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ART 340 (Milton Rugoff et al. eds., 1981)

(providing brief biography of L'Enfant).
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and Congress left the artistic formulation of the capital's design in
L'Enfant's hands.26 As might be expected in such a grand undertaking, disagreements occurred between the artist and the government
over many aspects of the project.2 7 Nevertheless, the government
largely implemented L'Enfant's plan2 8 and history has borne out
both the wisdom and aesthetic reward of the government's support of
L'Enfant's vision.
Since that early time, funding entities at all levels of government
have commissioned, sponsored, and otherwise supported artistic
projects and the artists who create them.2 9 For example, governmental support for artists and the arts typically came by way of contracts
for architectural or decorative work that became public property upon
completion or delivery." In addition, among the performing arts,
musical ensembles have always been a part of the armed forces.3
Despite the government's support of the arts, the establishment of an
official administrative agency for the arts was slow in coming. 2 The
prevailing American. mode of support and subsidy for the arts

26. See CAEMMERER, supra note 25, at 134-68 (providing excerpts of communications
between Washington,Jefferson, and L'Enfant reflecting government's confidence in L'Enfant's
artistic abilities).
27. See CAEMMERER, supra note 25, at 169-216 (providing excerpts of communications
between govemmentand L'Enfant reflecting disagreements over exhibition of plan, demolishing
of private house that interfered with city plan, expenses, and conflicts with governmentappointed authorities over construction matters).
28. See CAEMMERER, supranote 25, at 168 (stating that despite attempts of others to change
L'Enfant's plan, it remained intact).
29. See Serra v. General Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1047 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting long
history of government support for art and architecture).
30. This tradition is most notably implemented through the Federal Government's Art-inArchitecture Program in which one half of one percent of a building's cost is allocated to the
incorporation of artwork by American artists. Serra, 847 F.2d at 1047; see also 34 C.F.R. § 490.10
(1994) (explaining how to apply for grant). Many progressive minded municipalities and states
have followed the Federal Government's lead in promoting the arts through the dedication of
set percentages of public revenues or construction costs to the artistic enhancement of public
spaces. See, eg., MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE §§ 36.10-36.80 (1974) (establishing Minneapolis Arts
Commission and vesting in it power to accept art gifts and to recommend city commissions of
new art).
31. SeeNATiONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THEARTS, 1965-1985: A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF FEDERAL
INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARTS 5 (1985). After the defeat of Cornwallis' army at the battle of
Yorktown, the bands played the old English tune "The World Turned Upside Down" and
"Yankee Doodle" during the surrender ceremonies. See THOMAS J. FLEMING, BEAT THE LAST
DRUM: THE SIEGE OF YORKrOWN, 1781, at 328-29 (1963). At the first White House celebration
following news of Lee's surrender, President Lincoln asked the Marine Corps Band to play
"Dixie." See COURTLANDT CANBY, LINCOLN AND THE CIVIL WAR 350 (1960). Before going on to
international fname for his musical marches, John Philip Sousa began his career as an officer in
the Marine Corps Band. See generaly PAUL E. BIERLEY, JOHN PHILIP SOuSA, AMERICAN
PHENOMENON (1973).
32. President Buchanan sought to establish a National Commission of Fine Arts in the
1850s, but was unable to persuade Congress to allocate the necessary funding. LEONARD D.
DUBOFF, ART LAW 154 (1993). Similar efforts by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William
Howard Taft during the first decade of this century were unsuccessful. Id. at 154-57.
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followed the eighteenth and nineteenth century European paradigm
in which wealthy individuals, including aristocrats and the newly
emerging bourgeoisie, sponsored artistic works or events. 3
The first significant effort by the federal government to support art
and artists on an institutional basis occurred during the New Deal
era.34 In response to the economic hardships of the Depression,
Congress established the Works Progress Administration (WPA) to
help the unemployed get off relief rolls through massive public works
projects.' Within the WPA, Congress created four arts projects: the
Federal Arts Project (FAP), the Federal Musicians Project (FMP), the
Federal Theater Project (FTP), and the Federal Writers Project
(FWP). 3 Primarily intended to relieve unemployment, the FAP
alone supported over 5000 artists, and sponsored the creation of tens
of thousands of art works including paintings, murals, sculptures,
photographic exhibitions, theater performances, and concerts, as well
as scholarship and literary publications.3 Artists supported by the
WPA included Jackson Pollack, Mark Rothko, David Smith, Grant
Wood, Orson Welles, Aaron Copeland,James Michner, Rockwell Kent,
James Agee, and Dorthea Lange.38 Until overtaken by the events of
World War II, the WPA was a vital and driving force in the develop-

33. In the 1760s and 1770s, Benjamin Franklin bemoaned the lack of any evidence of
civilizing institutions within the new metropolis of Philadelphia, and worked his entire life to
find patronage and create a distinguished place for the arts and learning in colonial Philadelphia. RONALD W. CLARK, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: A BIOGRAPHY 50-51 (1983). Under Franklin's
direction, the first free public library was founded. Id. He was also instrumental in the creation
of the Pennsylvania Academy of the Arts, the University of Pennsylvania, and the country's first
hospital. Id. at 52. As the economy of the nation grew, wealthy merchants, financiers, and
industrialists increasingly promoted the arts. Such figures as Peter Cooper, Cornelius
Vanderbilt, Andrew Mellon, J.P. Morgan, Andrew Carnegie, John Rockefeller, Thomas
Corcoran,John Hay Whitney, and Solomon R. Guggenheim built theaters and museums, created
symphony orchestras, and supported the founding of art academies. See ALVIN TOFFLER, THE
CULTURE CONSUMERS 170 (1964) (discussing U.S. intellectual life, arts, and society).
34. Some states and cities, however, such as New York through its Civic Works Administration, had already established modest arts programs to help unemployed artists before the New
Deal era. DUBOFF, supra note 32, at 155.
35. Seegeneraly FINAL REPORT ON THE WPA PROGRAM 1935-43 (1947) (providing figures for
employment provided and funds expended by WPA); DONALD S. HOWARD, THE WPA AND
FEDERAL RELIEF POLICY (1973) (detailing program's requirements, number of people it
benefitted, and its shortcomings); THE BRrTANNICA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ART, supra note
25, at 606 (providing brief synopsis of WPA Federal Art Project).
36. DUBOFF, supranote 32, at 155-57.
37. THE BRITANNICA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ART, supra note 25, at 606. These
creations remain evident in murals, paintings, and sculpture in public buildings, schools, and
parks as well as in frequent museum exhibitions and retrospectives on Depression era art. See,
e.g., DUBOFF, supra note 32, at 155-56 (providing numbers of murals, sculptures, and paintings
produced by WPA's Federal Art Project); ROCKEFELLER PANEL, THE PERFORMING ARTS REPORT
ON THE FUTURE OF THEATRE, DANCE, MUSIC IN AMERICA 110-48 (1965) [hereinafter ROCKEFELLER
REPORT] (reviewing historical role of government in supporting arts); ZEIGLER, supra note 3, ht
6-8 (discussing work created by WPA).
38. ZEIGLER, supra note 3, at 6-8.
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ment of American art.39 Notwithstanding the many successes of
these programs, there was a constant undercurrent of opposition at
that time to federal support for the arts and artists.4 0 Part of this
opposition was a general disagreement with the concept of nonessential, "make-work" projects of any sort, but other criticisms
focused on .political or aesthetical views that invariably arose from
government-sponsored works that offended the sensibilities of certain
segments of the public. 4
Following a decade of pre-occupation with World War II and postwar readjustments by the Federal Government,' the Eisenhower
administration in 1955 proposed, unsuccessfully, to establish a federal
commission to support the arts."
Later, Jacqueline Kennedy
forcefully advocated this project in the early 1960s.' Subsequently,
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson appointed executive assistants to
advise them on the arts,45 and Congress created the National
Council on the Arts46 as a prelude to the establishment of the NEA.
B.

The NationalEndowment for the Arts (NEA)

In 1965, Congress created the National Foundation on the Arts and
Humanities (National Foundation). 4' The National Foundation
39. Although the WPA did not officially mandate or espouse any particular artistic style, its
workers were instrumental in the development of both the Regionalist style and the American
school of realism. See generally HALLIE FLANAGAN, ARENA: THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
THEATER (1940) (noting great variety of theatrical styles employed by Federal Theatre Project
(FTP) artists); FRANcIs V. O'CONNOR, THE NEv DEAL ART PROJECTS (1966) (reviewing
extraordinary range of expression and style used by artists in Federal Art Project (FAP)).
40. See FLANAGAN, supra note 39, at 334-36 (discussing that continued unjustitified
accusations that WPA was dominated by communists led to 1938 termination of FTP).
41. See FLANAGAN, supra note 39, at 335-37, 341 (discussing belief that FTP disseminated
communist propaganda); ZEIGLER, supranote 3, at 7-8 (discussing plays, such as The Cradle Will
Rock, that asserted artists' desire for freedom from government interference, and overall criticism
of FIP productions as vulgar and full of communist, propaganda).
42. See ZIEGLER, supranote 3, at 10-11 (stating that 1947-54 was "low point" in governmentarts relationship because artists were target of McCarthyism). Individual agencies of the
government continued to support artistic events and projects. For example, the Agency for
International Development (AID) and the State Department sponsored overseas tours by the
Martha Graham Dance Company to Europe and Asia in 1954 and 1955. DON McDONOUGH,
MARTHA GRAHAM: A BIOGRAPHY 227-53 (1973). Louis Armstrong and his orchestra toured
Africa and Latin America in the late 1950s under AID sponsorship. See ROCKEFELLER REPORT,
supranote 37, at 134-36 (discussing federal government programs that incidentally support arts,
such as United States Information Agency, which arranges cultural programs overseas for
individual artists and groups of artists).
43. ZEIGLER, supra note 3, at 8-18.
44. ZEIGLER, supra note 3, at 9.
45. ZEIGLEa, supra note 3, at 13-14, 18.
46. NationalArts and Cultural Development Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-579, § 5(a), 78 Stat.
905, 905-06, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1030, 1031 (appointing council of 24 distinguished
experts in arts to develop national arts policy).
47. National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-209, § 2,
79 Stat. 845, 846-49 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 951 (1994)).
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served as an umbrella organization for both the National Endowment
for the Humanities and for the NEA, the first national agency
expressly dedicated to the development and support of the arts.48
Congress broadly conceived the NEA as a means to address two
seemingly conflicting themes debated by supporters and opponents
of federal subsidies to the arts. The main thrust of the NEA would be
the promotion of excellence in the arts and culture.49 To calm fears
that an "official" culture might be established, however, the legislation
creating the NEA emphasized both the private sector's traditional role
in promoting the arts and principles of artistic freedom. 0 The
purpose of the NEA lay in the creation of a "climate encouraging
freedom of thought [and] imagination" and in the nurture of
"conditions facilitating the release of creative talent."5 1 The national
government desired a program embodying these values, reasoning
that an "advanced civilization must not limit its efforts to science and
technology alone, but must give full value and support to . . .
scholarly and cultural activity."2 Congress recognized that, as a
world leader, the United States must promote its status by advancing
"high qualities ... in the realm of ideas and of the spirit." 3
Within this context, the NEA's enabling legislation emphasized the
importance of local initiative from individuals, private organizations,
and state agencies in the furtherance of the arts. 4 The NEA's future
direction was to stem from a "broadly conceived national policy" for
the arts. 55 Congress specifically limited the authority of the NEA and
any other contributing federal agency to condition or dictate the
48. Id. § 5 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 954 (1994)).
49. See 20 U.S.C. § 954(c) (1994) (setting forth goals and responsibilities of NEA
leadership).
50. See id. § 951(2) (stating that support for arts is "primarily a matter for private and local
initiative"). During the debate to authorize the NEA, some expressed a fear that private
enthusiasm to fund the arts would dissipate. See ZEIGLER, supra note 3, at 14-16, 33-37
(expressing that federal funding would have "deadening" effect on arts). Five years later,
President Nixon recalled this same concern, finding that it was no longerjustified. President's
Remarks at the ACA's Annual Conference, 7 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOG. 816,817 (May 26, 1971).
Despite such concerns, it appeared that private funding for the arts had actually grown. Id. at
819; see ZEIGLER, supra note 3, at 34-37, 61-66 (indicating that NEA funding has stimulated
private donations to arts); see also INDEPENDENT SECTOR, A PORTRAIT OF THE INDEPENDENT
SECTOR: THE Ac=rv-rIEs AND FINANCES OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 35 (1993) (finding that
when governmental funding to non-profit area is increased, overall private contributions to that
area increase correspondingly).
51. 20 U.S.C. § 951(7) (1994). See generally NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, A GUIDE
TO THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS 1993-94 (1993) [hereinafter GUIDE] (expressing
agency's purpose to fund artists and setting forth goals of each agency program, such as for
dance, literature, opera, and theater).
52. 20 U.S.C. § 951(3).
53. Id. § 951(8).
54. See id. §§ 951(2), 954(c), (g).
55. Id. § 953(b).
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manner in which the recipients operated their programs.5 "Inthe
administration of [the Act] no department, agency, officer, or
employee of the United States shall exercise any direction, supervision, or control over the policy determination, personnel, or
other
curriculum, or the administration or operation of any school or
"7
non-Federal agency, institution, organization, or association. 5
Decisions about the actual grant-making by the NEA are left
principally in the hands of special "advisory panels" 5 8 that report to
the National Council on the Arts.5 9 The advisory panels are composed of experts from appropriate fields in the arts.' The Council
includes the Chairperson" of the NEA plus twenty-six members from
the private sector who are appointed by the President of the United
States on the basis of their expertise in the arts "so as to include
practicing artists [and] civic cultural leaders."62 Members of the
Council serve six-year terms on a rotating basis,65 and the Chairperson is appointed to serve a four-year term.' The Council advises the
Chairperson on matters of "policy, programs, and procedures" and
reviews grant applications recommended for funding by the advisory
panels.65
The general standards for approving grants focus on projects that
"have substantial.., artistic and cultural significance, giving emphasis
to American creativity ...and [contribute] to the encouragement of
Other criteria include support for
professional excellence."66
projects "of significant merit" that would otherwise be unavailable to
the public for geographic or economic reasons, 67 as well as projects
that promote the "wider distribution of [artists'] works" or projects
designed "to achieve standards of professional excellence."' In the

56. Id-§ 953(c).
57. Id.
58. Id. § 959(a) (4).
59. Id § 955(b).
60. Id § 959(a)(4).
61. Id. § 954(b).
62. Id. § 955(b)(2).
63. Id. § 955(c).
64. I& § 954(b)(2).
65. 1& § 955(f).
66. Id. § 954(c) (1). The grant-making process begins with the filing of an application for
funding under one of the various programs within the NEA. GUIDE, supranote 51, at 8-9. The
legal requirements have been satisfied.
NEA stafffirst reviews the application to see whether all
Id. Then the application isreferred to the appropriate advisory panel. Id. at 9. The panel
reviews the application and formulates arecommendation that isthen forwarded to the Council.
Id The Council in turn advises the Chairperson who makes a final determination. Id The
Chairperson isresponsible for approving allgrants.
67. 20 U.S.C. § 954(c) (2)(1994).

68.

Id § 954(c)(3).
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1980s, Congress added provisions to the National Foundation on the
Arts and Humanities Act to foster excellence, diversity and vitality in
the arts and help broaden the availability and appreciation of the
arts, with the goal of increasing minority participation °
Standards with respect to the actual qualities of a given project are
similarly broad. Advisory panelists must consider the artistic quality
and merit, of the projec t7 in addition to other objective factors such
as an organization's stability and evidence of community support.72
Factors such as "merit" and "artistic quality" are supremely subjective
terms. The potential for misapplication, favoritism, or abuse of
authority by a granting agency possessing this degree of discretion is
substantial. To protect the government, the tax-paying public, and
grantapplicants from.the capricious distribution of funding, Congress
established both an independent council and advisory panels of
73
experts to review applicants and recommend projects for funding.74
By deferring to private experts, who serve essentially as volunteers,
Congress ensured that subjective judgments would75be rendered fairly
in light of the best professional opinion available.
C. Recent NEA FundingControversies and the Callfor Government
Oversight
For the most part, the grant-making process has worked extremely
well. In its thirty year existence, the NEA has made over 100,000
grants.7 6 During that time, the agency received very few formal
69. Id § 954(c) (1).
70. 1& § 954(c)(4).
71. I& §§ 954(c)(1), (2).
72. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 33, 37, 42.
73. See supra notes 58-65 (discussing structure of NEA and role of advisory panels in
recommending projects for funding to Chairperson).
74. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 955(e)-(f) (1994) (outlining how advisory panelists work on part-time
basis and are paid small stipend plus expenses). Many hundreds of panelists serve the NEA at
any given time. The chief rewards for the panelists would seem to be the prestige associated
with serving the NEA and the opportunity to work with a distinguished group of colleagues.
ZEIGLER, supra note 3, at 159-61. Seegeneraly NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, HANDBOOK
FOR PANELISTS (1994) (providing basic information about NEA's budget, grant-making process,
and structure for members of advisory panels).
75. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 959(a) (4), (5) (1994) (allowing NEA Chairperson to employ experts
or to accept their voluntary services).
76. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, THE ARTS ENDOWMENT INBRIEF (Press Release)
(1993). Congress established The Independent Commission in 1989 to: "(A) [review] the
[NEA] grant making procedures, including those of its panel system, and (B) consider whether
the standard for publicly funded art-should be different than the standard for privately funded
art." Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-121, § 304(c) (1), 103 Stat. 701,742. Segenerally THE INDEPENDENT COMM'N, A REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION] (discussing re-authorization of NEA and recommending excision of content-based
restrictions on funded projects). The Independent Commission was a temporary creature
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complaints
about misapplied funds or projects that abused the public
7
7

trust.

Nevertheless, the recent outcry against the NEA for funding
galleries that had supported the Serrano and Mapplethorpe exhibitions78 was not the first time that public complaints had prompted
Congress to attempt to assert greater administrative control over the
grant-making process. 79 In 1984, leaders from the Italian-American
community criticized a performance of Puccini's Pdgoletto by the
English National Opera at the Metropolitan Opera in New York,

underwritten in part by an NEA Touring Program grant"0 They
argued that the opera depicted characters in an ethnically offensive
manner."1 Representative Mario Biaggi of New York complained to
the NEA and threatened to introduce legislation to ensure that the
Federal Government would be impeded from funding productions
containing "any ethnic or racially offensive material." 2
A year later, a controversy arose concerning an NEA-funded
publication of allegedly pornographic poetry.8 3 Nevertheless, until

formed by the appointment of twelve members: four were appointed by the President, four by
the Speaker of the House, and four by the President pro tempore of the Senate. M at 43-45.
77. See INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 76, at 37-41 (discussing various controversies
over grants for art that were criticized for lacking artistic quality or for being offensive or
obscene).
78. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note
76, at 39 (discussing exhibitions and their surrounding controversy). "The Serrano work ,Piss
Christ,' was of a photograph of a crucifix submerged in a container of the artist's urine."
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 76.

The Mapplethorpe exhibit contained "explicit

photographs portraying sadomasochistic and homoerotic activities, and nude children." Id.
79. See Karen Fricker, Culturewith Clinton, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1993, at xviii (stating that 12
years of Republican administrations had been, at times, "openly hostile to the arts" and had
"suffocated the arts").
80. See INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 76, at 38.
81. See INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supranote 76, at 38. The English National Opera (ENO)
production portrayed the opera's characters as mafioso gangsters and reset the action "from
sixteenth century Mantua to NewYork's Little Italy in the 1950s." Roland Gellatt, London's Other
Opera, OPERA NEWS, June 1984, at 8-9. In the production, the Duke ran "a chrome-plated
restaurant" that served as a front for racketeers, while Rigoletto was played as a wise-guy waiter.
Id. Sparafucile appeared as a hit man from New Jersey. Id. Supernumeraries were
conspicuously dressed in pin-striped suits and fedora hats. Id. The local cop on the beat was
pointedly paid-off. RobertJacobson, New York, OPERA NEWS, Oct. 1984, at 40, 46. The Order
of Sons of Italy deemed the performance to be ethnically disparaging and an offensive reenforcement of a stereotypical image of Italian-Americans. Robert D. McFadden, A Modernized
"Rigoletto" is Attacked, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1984, at B1.
82. The GrantMakingProcessofthe NationalEndowmentfor the Arts: HearingBeforethe Subcomm.
on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Gong., 2d Sess. 2
(1984) (statement of Rep. Mario Biaggi). For an extensive analysis of the controversy over the
NEA's funding of the ENO's Rigoletto,see Enrique R. Carrasco, Note, The NationalEndowmentfor
the Arts: A Search for an Equitable Grant Making Process, 74 GEO.'LJ. 1521, 1521-24 (1986)
(concluding that content-based restrictions on federal subsidies to arts are constitutionally
invalid).
83. See Mary Battiata, NEA's Pornography Ruckus, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1985, at C1
(summarizing views of members of Congress who believed that, because government provides
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Congress passed the Helms Amendment in 1989,' 4 legislative efforts
to require the NEA to screen projects for ethnic and racially offensive
subject matter or for other indecent content had consistently
failed.85 Reasons for not passing such legislation varied from the
desire to keep politics and personal bias out of the funding process,86 to the belief that such regulation was unconstitutional.8 7

funds, it could set standards for refusing to fund "offensive" works); Irvin Molotsky, Of
Pornography and U.S. Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1985, at A20 (discussing contentions by
Congressmen Thomas D. DeLay and Dick Armey that NEA granted funds to poets who wrote
obscene works).
84. The Helms Amendment originally sought to prohibit the funding of "obscene" and
"indecent" works of art, and "material which denigrates the objects or beliefs of the adherents
of a particular religion or nonreligion" and "material which denigrates, debases, or reviles a
person, group, or class of citizens on the basis of race, creed, sex, handicap, age or national
origin." 135 CONG. REc. S8862 (daily ed. July 26, 1989). The language eventually adopted by
Congress stated.
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated for the National Endowment for the

Arts... may be used to promote, disseminate, or produce materials which in the

judgment of the National Endowment for the Arts... may be considered obscene,
including but not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual
exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts and which, when taken as
a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101121, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 701, 741 (1989) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 954 (1994)). NEA regulations
subsequently required that all grant recipients, certify under oath that they would remain in
compliance with the language of § 304(a) and not produce obscene art. Bella Lewitsky Dance
Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774,776 (C.D. Cal. 1991); INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra
note 76, at 87-88.
85. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supranote 76, at 38-39 (discussing attempts in 1971 and 1985
to amend NEA control over artistic freedom of grantees); see Alagna, supra note 5, at 1548-53

(listing unsuccessful proposals to prohibit funding of material that is offensive to religious
groups, races, genders, handicapped persons, ethnic groups, or age groups).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57 (discussing how Congress limited authority of
federal agencies to control how recipients of NEA money operated programs); see also
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 76, at 83-91 (recommending independent evaluation of

NEA-funded projects without decency restrictions imposed by Congress).
87. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supranote 76, at 83-87. With respect to the constitutionality
of restrictions on federal subsidies to the arts, the Commission's Consensus Statement states in
pertinent part:
When funding denials are the product of invidious discrimination with the aim of
suppressing a particular message and for no other reason, a particularly powerful case
might be made that the decision was unconstitutional .....
The NEA currently requires all grant recipients to certify, under oath, that they will
adhere to and enforce a ban on any use of NEA funds for purposes which the NEA
"may consider" to be obscene. Some of the legal advisors to the Independent
Commission believe this requirement is unconstitutional; all believe the insistence on
such a requirement is unwise and recommend against it.
Id.at 86, 87.
It should be noted that "speech" that is obscene is not protected by the Constitution under
the test enunciated in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20-21, 24 (1973). It is well within the
right of Congress to forbid the funding of obscene art as defined in Miller. Indecent or
offensive speech, however unappealing to the community, is protected by the First Amendment.
Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); see also infra note 319 and accompanying text.
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The Helms Amendment and the revised (and softened) legislation
of the following year 8 were the first content-based regulations
successfully imposed on the NEA. Although courts eventually found
both enactments to be unconstitutional, 9 the call for similar
regulation now seems to have become an annual ritual in Congress.9"
The congressional and public discontent with the NEA, which is
limited to a relatively small but vocal number of partisans, 91 points
to the unavoidable tension that has always characterized the concept
of government subsidies to the arts. This tension is between the
general desire to support the creative talent of artists and their artistic
achievements9 2 and a fear that the government will either attempt
to censor the content of funded projects,93 or impose a dominant
artistic ethos on the arts community which would have the same
censorial effect.9 4
In terms of the political give-and-take behind this tension, the
professional, if subjective, standards applied by the NEA in its grant-

88. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 101-512, § 103, 104 Stat. 1915, 1963 (1990) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1994))
(modifying 1989 Act to ban only funding of "obscene" art and eliminating oath requirement).
89. See Finley v. NEA, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1472-76 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding content-based
restrictions imposed by 1990 Act on NEA grantees to be unconstitutional); Bella Lewitsky Dance
Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774,781-85 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (holding § 304 of 1989 Act and
NEA "decency oath" unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth).
90. See, e.g., Fricker, supranote 79 (reviewing legislative proposals and opposition's criticism
of Clinton administration's plans for NEA); Robert Hughes, The NEA TrampledAgain, TIME,June
22, 1992, at 43 (discussing renewed political debate over NEA appropriations); Jacqueline
Trescott, Arts Agency Regains Some Groundin Senate; WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1995, at CI (reviewing
most current congressional action) ;Jacqueline Trescott, NEA ChiefEndoresesArtisticFreedom,WASH.
POST, Oct. 12, 1994, at C2 (discussing recent attacks by congressional critics of NEA's funding
policies).
91. SeeMathews, supranote 17, at50 (noting that minority ofpeople interviewed for Gallup
Organization poll felt laws were necessary to prohibit offensive material as products of federally
funded arts projects).
92. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (observing that legislation that created
NEA emphasized importance of artistic creativity).
93. See NationalArtsand HumanitiesFoundations:JointHearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Arts and
Humanities of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Wefar, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58 (1965)
(statement of actor Charlton Heston) ("The artist's point of view, I suppose, has always been
reduced to its simplest terms, 'Give me the money, but do not tell me what to do."'). See
generally H.? REP. No. 618, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3186-88.
94. H.R. REP. No. 618, supra note 93, at 3203-08 (describing minority views that political
control of arts will reduce America's "cultural level" and preferring alternatives to direct
funding). Russell Lymes, editor of Harper's commented, "Federal subsidies will ... contribute
to a spirit of compromise and conservatism in art." Id. at 21. But see supra notes 54-57 and
accompanying text (indicating Congress' intent that NEA would not control policies or
curriculum of non-federal organizations). Fears that the federal government's involvement in
funding the arts would lead to a situation similar to a Soviet style Zhdanovian control over the
arts or, more mildly, the "official" influence of the Beaux Arts style under Napoleon III in
France in the 1860s, have proven to be completely misplaced. See generallyEDWARD ARIAN, THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE: PUBLIC SUBSIDY OF THE ARTS INAMERICA (1989); DONALD NETZER, THE
SUBSIDIZED MUSE (1978).
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making process are both a strength and a weakness. If the grant
process is fair and supports genuine artistic merit, all constituents,
including the public, elected officials, and the arts community, should
be satisfied by the independent and professional administration of
NEA funds.95 When a particular group is especially offended by a
publicly funded arts project, however, the appearance of fairness and
accountability dissolves, breaking down the decisionmaking consensus.9 Although the offending artistic expression may be protected
by the Constitution,9 7 the rationale for public funding of such work
runs into serious difficulty. Consequently, the essential administrative
challenge for the NEA is to maintain a balanced funding policy that
respects the artistic freedom of its grantees but also produces work
that does not unduly shock or offend the public.

II.

FUNDING RESTRICTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION

A.

Positive and Negative Liberty

Governmental subsidies for the arts are not entitlements under the
Constitution." The discretionary right of the government to grant
or deny funding to recipients, consequently, would seem to give the
government the power to restrict the use of its largesse.9 9 In
essence, the government's greater power to deny carries with it the
4'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
lesser power to restrict."
95. See Carrasco, supra note 82, at 1534 (noting that perception of fairness is critical to
public confidence in NEA's grant-making process).
96. Carrasco, supra note 82, at 1534.
97.

See infra Part IIl.

98. See INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 76, at 85. The commission noted:
1. There is no constitutional obligation on the part of the federal government to fund
the arts. That is a policy decision to be determined by Congress based upon its
views as to whether it is useful and wise for the federal government to play a role in
the arts funding process. The Constitution offers no guidance as to whether the arts
should be funded by the federal government.
2. If federal funds are used to subsidize the arts, however, constitutional limitations on
how the arts are funded may come into play. The most important of these is that
while Congress has broad powers as to how to spend public funds, it may not do so
in a way that the Supreme Court has said is "aimed at the suppression of dangerous
ideas."
Id (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)).
99. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 195 (1991) (holding that government could fund
abortion while placing restrictions on use of "abortion counseling as a method of family
planning"); see also supranotes 10, 19 and accompanying text (noting that restrictions involved
in receipt of federal funds had previously been thought to be prohibited under Constitution).
100. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 345-46
(1986) (stating that "the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes
the lesser power" to discourage it through advertising ban); Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251,
264-65 (1932) (Sutherland,J.) (holding that state may condition carrier's use of public funded
highways in any manner it deems appropriate); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1,
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Court in Rust, believed that government funding for a specific project
comes as a package.10' The recipient must accept the package "as
is," or decline the offer and operate with private funds.10 2 The
Supreme Court relied on similar reasoning in Buckley v. Valeo1°3 to
uphold government funding for political campaigns conditioned on
recipients being subject to limits on the use of private funds.'"
Thus, if candidates for public office chose to spend unrestricted
private funds, they were foreclosed from accepting government
°5
subsidies.
This line of reasoning also prevailed in Regan v. Taxation With
Representation0 , in which the Court held that the government could
deny certain tax exemptions to nonprofit organizations that engaged
in political lobbying.'
The Court found that, because tax exemptions for donations to nonprofit organizations were discretionary
subsidies for specified activities, such as political lobbying,0l 8 the
government could properly choose not to consider political lobbying
for such a subsidy.' 9
An excellent articulation of the philosophical foundation for this
line of reasoning is found in Isaiah Berlin's essay on the concept of
positive and negative liberty.110 Berlin writes that negative liberty is
based in the concept that there are pre-existing spheres of private
freedom within which the government may not exercise controlling
authority.'
The government may not limit the freedom of a
private party to act or spend private resources in the exercise of these
freedoms.1 The essential element of this principle is that one may

53 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that power to deny whole encompasses ability to
restrict parts); supra notes 19-20; cf. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42
(1987) (ruling that state's power to deny building permit did not authorize Fifth Amendment
taking of related property right from owner as condition of granting permit).
101. Rust, 500 U.S. at 198-99.
102. Id.at 196.
103. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
104. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-96 (1976).
105. Id. at 99.
106. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
107. Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545-46 (1983).
108. IL at 546.
109. I& at 547-48.
110. See ISAIAH BERIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-72 (1964) (arguing that individual
liberty is distinct and autonomous from governmental initiatives to control or promote public
interests); see also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1956) (1859)
(proposing thesis, later adopted by Libertarians, that government is entitled to do nothing more
than prevent people from harming each other). See generally ROBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE
AND UTOPIA (1974) (advocating libertarian argument that sole function of government is to
protect negative rights).
111.

BERLIN, supranote 110, at 122-31.

112.

BERLIN,

supranote 110, at 122-31.
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act insofar as one is able through the use of one's own resources.1 s
Within this sphere of private freedom, the government may not
is no entitlement to
restrict actions but, at the same time, there
14
government assistance to enable the act.'
At the opposite philosophical pole is the concept of positive liberty,
postulating that one cannot exercise a right within a protected sphere
of freedom if resources are unavailable to enable the action to take
place." 5 For example, in Gideon v. Wainwright,"6 the Supreme
Court held that the constitutional right to representation by counsel
would be rendered meaningless if an indigent person's poverty
prevented him from fairly presenting a defense in the face of the
state's vast power to prosecute."' Although the Constitution does
not specifically grant the right to appointed counsel, it does give each
person the right to a fair trial.18 In the context of a criminal
prosecution, the Court in Gideon ruled that the state must provide
resources that enable the indigent person accused of a serious crime
to obtain effective assistance of counsel to ensure a fair trial." 9
Our national experience and traditional view of individual rights,
however, has weighed heavily in favor of the concept of freedom
embodied in negative liberty. 2 The constitutional right to exercise
a certain freedom has almost never included the right to a governRather, we think of
ment subsidy in support of such action.'

113.

BERLIN, supra note 110, at

114.
115.

BERLIN, supra note
BERLIN, supra note

122-31.

110, at 131-34.
110, at 144, 162-63.

116. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
117. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). In Gideon, the Court emphasized:
[O]ur state and national constitution and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural
and substantive safeguards designed to ensure fair trials before impartial tribunals in
which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be
realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer
to assist him.
Id.
118. Id. at 342; see U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI (giving accused in criminal prosecutions right to
.speedy and public trial, by an impartial juy... to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation" and to be able to confront prosecution witnesses).
119. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344; see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)
(extending right to counsel to indigent misdemeanor defendants threatened with imprisonment); In reGault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967) (indigentjuveniles); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 357 (1963) (indigents who appeal criminal convictions as matter of right).
120. See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1423 (stating that constitutional tradition places many
limits on government but mandates few affirmative benefits for individuals).
121. One notable exception to the negative liberty presumption is the right of an indigent
criminal suspect to government appointed counsel if accused of a crime carrying the possibility
of ajail sentence. See Argersinger. 407 U.S. at 32; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 347; supranotes 115-19 and
accompanying text.
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governmental subsidies as a form of public philanthropy or lar' that is handed out as a matter of political discretion and not
gesse "22
as a constitutionally mandated right or liberty. 2 3 In this discretionary context, a subsidy that benefits the recipient is subject to
governmental restriction. For example, in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New
Bedford,124 Justice Holmes rejected a policeman's claim that he was
unconstitutionally fired from his position because of his political
views. 1' In an opinion written early in his career, while serving on
the Massachusetts high court, Holmes wrote, "[He] may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman."126 To Holmes, the work of a policeman and the
discussion of politics were separable. The constitutional right to talk
politics simply did not coincide with the right to hold a public job,
to deny the
and the City of New Bedford was perfectly entitled
27
employment.
municipal
of
largesse
the
policeman
Thus, Gideon is something of an exception when it comes to the
direct application of the concept of positive liberty.128 Efforts to
29
secure constitutional entitlements in the areas of education,
122. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733, 733 (1964) (commenting that
from mid-1950s through mid-1960s, one of most important "developments in United States...
has been the emergence of government as a major source of wealth").
123. SeeEPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supranote 11, at309-12 (arguing that amendment designed to limit scope of government should not be converted into provision that
mandates perpetual government involvement in funding); Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1424
(explaining that constitutional law regards most governmental benefits as discretionary policies,
which are to be reviewed with deference).
124. 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
125. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass. 1892).
126. Iadat 517. "There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree
to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of
his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are
offered him." Id. at 517-18. First Amendment restrictions such as those imposed upon
policemen in New Bedford remained prevalent in government employment well into the first
half of this century, not only for positions in public safety and services, but significantly for
school teachers and university professors. See Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 366 (Tenn. 1927)
(holding that law forbidding teaching of evolution in pubic schools did not violate state or
Forgotten Years,
federal Constitutions). See generally David M. Rabban, The FirstAmendment in Its
90 YALE LJ.514 (1981) (discussing history of first amendment right to free speech prior to
World War I).
127. McAuiffe, 29 N.E. at 518-19.
128. Subsequent to the Gideon line ofjurisprudence, the Supreme Court has held that there
is no constitutionally protected right to court appointed counsel in optional criminal appeals.
SeePennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (state courts); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,
615 (1974) (federal courts).
What is true for criminal appeals afortioriextends to civil daims that are by nature optional
even where implicating a fundamental right. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S.
18, 26-27 (1981) (holding that court appointed lawyer is not required in child custody action
against indigent woman serving prison sentence).
129. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (holding that
application of strict scrutiny test was improper where system provided for basic educational
needs).
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welfare, 13 housing,' 31 food,12 and public safety' 3 have all
failed, and these failures illustrate the weakness of the concept of
positive liberty as a force in our political tradition.
There are, nonetheless, areas of government action in which the
courts have split, the difference between the government's power of
discretionary funding (negative freedom) and the recipients'
entitlement to mandatory subsidies (positive liberty). This is evident
in First Amendment cases where certain types of governmental
property or services are used in the exercise of fundamental
rights,'" or when the government acts as an employer 5 or sup36
ports education and the arts.

130. SeeJefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1972) (holding that allocation of welfare
benefits is discretionary and not constitutionally required); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
486 (1970) (ruling that state provision of welfare benefits was matter of legislative discretion).
131. Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (stating that assuring adequate housing is
legislative function, not judicial one).
132. See Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 372-73 (1988) (holding that federal
regulations denying food stamps to striking workers is within discretion of Congress); see also
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1985) (upholding restrictions on use of food
stamps by recipients, including imposition of criminal penalties for use violations).
133. SeeGarcia v. San Antonio Metro. TransitAuth., 469 U.S. 528,543-44 (1985) (noting that
public services now taken for granted were not originally required or expected ofgovernment).
Police and fire protection, for example, are not mentioned in the Constitution. Cf. Laurence
H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and'Affirmative Rights to
Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1175-90 (1977) (arguing that Congress'
power to regulate "traditional" and "integral" state functions is based primarily on affirmative
duty of states to provide those functions to their citizens rather than on notions of federalism).
134. See, eg., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395,2405 (1992) (holding
discretionary charge for police protection of public demonstration invalid); Schaumberg v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 639 (1980) (upholding solicitation through public
canvassing); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556-57 (1975) (use of
public theaters); Sala v. City of New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (use of loudspeakers in
public place); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (door-to-door canvassing); Hague
v. Committee for Indus. Org. (CIO), 307 U.S. 496,515-16 (1939) (fair use of streets and parks);
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938) (distribution of literature along public streets).
This right to exercise one's First Amendment rights on government property is known as the
public forum doctrine. See GERALD GUNTHER, INDMDUAL RIGHTS INCONSTITUTIONALI.LAW 92024 (1992). The doctrine holds that "traditional" forums of public expression, typically streets,
parks and public theaters, are not subject to governmental bans on speech or assembly without
the most compellingjustification. Id. at 920-21 & n.1. The doctrine encompasses protection
from discretionary licensing, fees, and ejection on the basis of content or speakers' viewpoint.
Id. at 921-22, 961-63.
135. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
556 (1973) (upholding law that prohibited federal employees from engaging in political activity
while working, but re-emphasizing freedom of governmental employees to exercise their First
Amendment freedoms separately from their governmental occupations); Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 563 (1968) (reversing dismissal of teacher who wrote letter to newspaper
criticizing local school board and its policies). But see Hatch Act Reform Amendment of 1993,
Pub. L No. 103-94, § 9(a), 107 Stat. 1003 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1994)) (prohibiting
federal employees from engaging in political activity while on duty).
136. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (stating that
academic freedom rests upon First Amendment grounds whether it pertains to "who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study"); Healy vJames,
408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972) (holding that academic freedom encompasses freedom of students
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In these situations, the courts have generally found that when the
government acts with its "public face," the First Amendment protects
the beneficiary. 37 When, however, the government acts with its
"private face," the First Amendment will not apply except for certain
limitations with respect to discrimination on the basis of viewpoint. 38
The government acts with a "public face" when it operates facilities
or spaces that are recognized as public forums, such as streets,
sidewalks, public theaters and parks." 9 In areas where the government has a monopoly on the given activity, such as law enforcement,
the government is subject to constitutional restrictions on its ability to
limit public activity within recognized spheres of freedom. These
spheres encompass the home and person,' 4° the voting booth,1"4'

to exercise fundamental rights within educational sphere); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (striking down loyalty oaths for faculty as violation of First Amendment
protection of academic freedom); see also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 557 (1975) (noting that dramatic production in municipal theater is immune from ban
under First Amendment principles); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 514 (1960) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("The actor on stage or screen, the artist whose creation is in oil or clay or marble
... are beneficiaries of freedom of expression."); Piarowski v. Illinois Community College, 759
F. 2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that First Amendment protects artistic expression unless
it is legally obscene).
137. See e.g., Board ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,868 (1982) (recognizing FirstAmendment
rights of students in school library); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(asserting that neither students nor teachers "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate"); Poe, 367 U.S. at 513-14 (acknowledging First
Amendment rights of doctors to advise patients about medical issues).
138. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,788 (1985) (finding
that federal government offices are non-public forums and upholding limits on access by private
organizations and persons not engaged in government business); City Council of Los Angeles
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 789 (1984) (upholding municipal ordinance forbidding
advertising on lampposts and telephone poles in order to promote more efficient maintenance
so long as restrictions are viewpoint neutral); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 37 (1983) (upholding limitations on private access to inter-school mail system in
order to facilitate inter-office communication).
139. SeeUnited States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736-37 (1990) (re-affirming protected status
of traditional public forums for expressive activity, but asserting that non-traditional public
forums may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions); see also supra note
133 and accompanying text (describing how government has assumed certain obligations in area
of public safety which were not originally anticipated). Courts are beginning to accord certain
quasi-public spaces, such as privately owned shopping malls, the legal status of a public forum.
See New Jersey Coalition Against War v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 775 (N.J. 1994)
(holding that shopping centers, as quasi-town centers, are required to permit distribution of
leaflets on societal issues, subject to reasonable conditions).
140. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
.... "); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1980) (discussing how woman's right to
choose abortion falls within personal liberty interest of Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause).
141. See U.S. CoNsT. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI (guaranteeing federal voting rights for
citizens over age of eighteen, regardless of race, previous condition of servitude, sex, and
financial ability); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 805-06 (1983) (striking down
discriminatory restrictions on independent candidates); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149
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The government acts with a "private face"

when it operates a facility as if it were the private owner of a nonmonopolistic enterprise, such as a post office," an office building, 144 or an airport. 145 In these areas, the government may act as
a private owner might and turn away public speakers at its door
without implicating First Amendment rights.
Interestingly, when the government subsidizes education, it acts
with both its "public" and "private face." High school students do not
abandon their right to free speech or assembly when they enter the
The Supreme Court, however, has distinguished
schoolhouse.14
occasions in which a public school acts with a "private face," such as
147
when it attempts to regulate the content of a school's curriculum.
Similarly, public employees no longer waive their right to free
speech at the government's office door' 4s as the Massachusetts court
held in McAulffe 4 9 A government employee may talk politics as a
citizen about public issues of the day."5 Public employees may
criticize the President 5 1 or the local district attorney,15 2 so long as

(1972) (invalidating filing fee requirements for candidates); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (striking down state restrictions on voting qualifications not
related to age and residency).
142. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, X1V (guaranteeing due process, fundamental fairness, and
equal protection of laws); see also Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981) (holding that
financially imposed evidentiary burdens on indigent people in civil proceedings violate due
process and equal protection); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (holding that state may
not restrict criminal appellants' access to judicial review by imposition of financial obstacles).
143. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727-30 (holding that location and physical characteristics of
property do not necessarily dictate level of judicial scrutiny).
144. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (upholding
time, place, and manner restrictions on First Amendment activities in non-public forums).
145. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2709 (1992)
(finding that municipal airports are not public forums, and therefore, upholding ban on
solicitations in terminals).
146. See Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. DiSt., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (upholding high school
student's right to free speech if not disruptive of school's program and activities).
147. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,276 (1988) (upholding principal's
right to censor articles published in school newspaper where such journalism is part of
instructional program).
148. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 413 (1979) (holding that
private, as well as public, expression by public employees concerning matters of public import
are protected by First Amendment).
149. See supranotes 124-27 and accompanying text (discussing Holmes' decision in McAuliffe
v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892)).
150. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 419; seePerry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972) (invalidating
non-renewal of employment contract because of government employee's exercise of First
Amendment rights); see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 608-09 (1967) (holding
that academic freedom includes'right to speak publicly).
151. SeeRankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 392 (1987) (holding that county may not dismiss
clerk for comment that someone should assassinate President Reagan where such speech posed
no danger to work place functions).
152. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (holding criticism of public policy valid
if not disruptive of agency operations).
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the speech does not disrupt governmental functions or is done on the
employee's own time. 5 3 These rights, however, may be limited in
the context of workplace grievances.TM If the employee's speech
activity constitutes insubordination, it may result in job loss."5 5
Likewise, government employees may participate in political campaigns, 56 but not in the workplace or on the government's
time.1 7 In sum, the example of the government employee illustrates the distinction between the government's "public" and "private
faces." As a citizen, the employee may exercise his or her First
Amendment rights. As a worker, however, the same employee faces
the sort of speech restrictions that any private employer might impose
in the workplace.
The difference between government action, in either its public or
private modes, illustrates the paradox of government support for the
arts. On the one hand, the public desires to support artistic values
and works.' 58 On the other hand, there is an urge to dominate or
control the artistic output of those recipients who benefit from the
government's largesse.159 As a promoter of the public expression of
images and ideas, the government wears its "public face.""6 As the
contractor of benefits to private individuals and groups, however, the
government may be viewed as acting in a private capacity.' 1 Within
this framework, both advocates and opponents of the constitutional
basis for restrictions on governmental subsidies have struggled to
establish whether a public or a private function underlies a given

153. Md. at 151; see also Pickeringv. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,574-75 (1968) (invalidating
school policy restricting rights of employees to criticize policy because employment was only
"tangentially and unsubstantially in the subject matter of the public communication").
154. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 (upholding finding that employee's grievance did not
fall under rubric of matters of "public concern").
155. Id at 148.
156. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
556 (1973) (holding that neither First Amendment nor other provisions of Constitution would
invalidate law "barring partisan political conduct by federal employees").
157. 1& at 558; see supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing use of government
property to exercise fundamental rights).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 48-53 (discussing Congress' aim to develop and
support arts through its creation of NEA).
159. See supra note 94 (discussing fear that government may attempt to censor funded
projects or compromise artists' works).
160. Seesupranotes 134-42 and accompanying text (discussing how First Amendment protects
beneficiary when government acts with its "public face").
161. See EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WIrrTH
THE STATE, supra note 11, at 5 ("[T]he government
(sometimes conceived as an individual, sometimes not) may be able to withhold certain benefits
absolutely from a person, or it may be able to confer those benefits to a person unconditionally.").
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subsidy.'62 If the functional baseline falls within the public sphere
of governmental activity, the imposition of restrictions that inhibit or
curtail the exercise of fundamental rights will likely be struck
If the functional baseline falls within a private sphere of
down. "
government activity, then restrictions generally will be upheld." 4
The predominant legal theory that courts have applied to ascertain
the public/private baseline of a governmental action is the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions.
B.

UnconstitutionalConditions

For some time, the Court has held unambiguously that contentbased speech restrictions imposed by the government violate the First
When restrictions involve government-funded
Amendment."
speech, however, the protection afforded by the First Amendment is
less clear. Professor Kathleen Sullivan writes, "The imposition of the
condition on the benefit poses a dilemma: allocation of the benefit
would normally be subject to deferential review, while imposition of
a burden on the constitutional right would normally be strictly
scrutinized."'" Over the decades, the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions has evolved to address such matters in order to prevent the
government from indirectly burdening constitutional rights that would
otherwise be strictly scrutinized as restrictions that directly impede
assertion of those rights. 67 Although the doctrine does not provide
that government benefits are entitlements, or that they need to be
provided at all, it holds that such benefits may not be conditioned
upon the surrender of fundamental rights or be distributed according
to unconstitutional standards once the benefits are granted.)'
The doctrine developed during the Lochnerperiodwhen the Court
struck down state statutes that limited economic activities of private

162.

See, e.g., Serra v. General Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1049 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming

GSA's Authority to maintain government property prevails over First Amendment rights ofArtist
commissioned to create work).
163. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199-200 (1991) (recognizing that existence of
government "subsidy" does not justify restriction of free speech in traditional public areas).
164. See id. at 194-95 (arguing that group was not being singled out because of content of
speech, but because speech was outside scope of funding).
165. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) ("The
First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on
particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic."); see also
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("[O]ur people are guaranteed the right to
express any thought, free from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden
censorship is content control.").
166. Sullivan, supranote 11, at 1422.
167. Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1421-22.
168. Sullivan, supranote 11, at 1415.
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citizens on the principle that such governmental restrictions or
regulations infringed upon the constitutional right of the individual
to contract freely.1" 9 During the New Deal era when the hegemony
of the Lochnerdecisions over states' economic authority dissolved, the
applicability of the doctrine to cases of individual rights remained
quietly intact.1 70 An early case in a line of decisions strictly scrutinizing governmental benefits predicated on conditions limiting, speech
activities of the beneficiary is Speiser v. Randall.7 1 In Speiser,Justice
Brennan wrote that the denial of a government benefit for engaging,
or refusing to engage, in certain forms of speech "necessarily will have
the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed
speech. The denial is frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous
ideas."172 The Court extended this line of reasoning to conditions
of political conformity, or silence, imposed on government employees1 73 and to employment benefits based on a requirement to work
on the Sabbath. 74
In FCC v. League of Women Voters,' 75 the Court held that a funding
condition that prohibited editorializing by public broadcasting stations

169. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down state economic
regulation of private corporations and applying strict scrutiny to such legislative conditions
under due process clauses of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). The Court in Lochner
accorded the liberty to contract free from state interference fundamental status under principles
of substantive due process. Id.at 57.
Although not explicitly stated in the Constitution, but well-established in common law, this
right to contractual freedom was viewed as integral to a fundamental understanding of
constitutional authority. The Lochner decision ushered in a historical era, falling roughly
between 1900 and 1937. See Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw §§ 8-2 to 8-4,
at 567-74 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing Lochner era where Court invalidated much state and federal
legislation). See generally Gerald Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Modelfor a Newer EqualProtection,86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972) (discussing 1971 Supreme
Court treatment of equal protection); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984) (postulating that politically powerful persons receive greater
constitutional protections).
170. Rosenthal, supranote 11, at 1144.
171. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
172. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (internal quotations omitted).
173. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1976) (stating that county patronage system,
whereby civil employees not sharing specific political party affiliation were dismissed, limited
freedom of belief and association); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968)
(holding that threat of dismissal from public employment inhibits freedom of speech and,
therefore, public school teachers could not be dismissed for speaking on public issues where
employment was not subject of public communication).
174. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 138 (1987) (stating that
employer's denial of employment benefits to one who observes her religion by refusing to work
on Saturdays violated Constitution); Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind.Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707, 717-18 (1981) (holding that employer could not withhold benefits from employee who
exercised First Amendment right to free exercise of religion); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403-04 (1963) (holding that employee cannot be denied benefits for refusing to work on
Saturdays based on religious reasons).
175. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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was unconstitutional because it was based "solely on the... content
of the suppressed speech." '76 Although the federal funds accepted
by the broadcasting station constituted only one percent of its
operating budget, the FCC restriction burdened the use of private
funds for editorial purposes because both resources were indistinguishably part of the same budget.177 Such a restriction was "'motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail expression of a
particular point of view'"178 and amounted to an unconstitutional
penalty on the
right of the station to use its private funding to
79
editorialize.

Similarly, three years later in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland,' the Court held that a state tax on general-interest
magazines, which exempted certain other publications such as sports,
religious, trade, and professional journals, violated the First Amendment because the tax burdens were based on each journal's particular
subject matter or content. 81 In Speiser, League of Women Voters, and
Arkansas Writers'Project,the Court viewed the benefit as an impermissi82
ble penalty on the recipient's exercise of a fundamental freedom.
This line ofjurisprudence is completely consistent with the essential
tenets of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Parallel to the above cases, the Court has developed a complementary scheme ofjurisprudence. If conditions imposed by government
funding may be properly classified as "nonsubsidies," rather than as
"penalties" that would violate the Constitution, they are not subject to
strict scrutiny. 8 3 A nonsubsidy may be defined as funding dedicated
to a specific purpose for which the recipient must agree to use the

176. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984).
177. I& at 400.
178. Id at 383-84 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
546 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
179. Id. at 384 (explaining that FCC restriction abridged First Amendment freedoms because
it singled out noncommercial broadcasters to deny them right to address issues of public importance).
180. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
181. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228-30 (1987).
182. Id. at 230 (holding that state's system of selective taxation required state's examination
of particular content of magazine publications and violated First Amendment); Leagueof Women
Voters, 468 U.S. at 395 (holding Public Broadcasting Company Act's regulation prohibiting
noncommercial stations that received public funding from editorializing impermissibly reached
variety of speech having no nexus to government); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958)
(invalidating conditioning of governmental benefit on recipient's espousal of particular views
as violation of free speech).
183. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (explaining that
government's decision not to fund particular exercise of fundamental political right to lobby is
not subject to strict scrutiny because nonsubsidies do not function as obstacle to exercising such
right).
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funds exclusively. In Buckley v. Valeo,1 4 for example, the Court
distinguished between a constitutional penalty and a nonsubsidy when
it noted that a general cap on private contributions to political
campaigns would violate the First Amendment,"s but held that
limits on private contributions could be imposed on candidates who
accepted public campaign funding. 8 The Court noted that public
funding of political campaigns had the opposite effect of limiting
candidates' First Amendment rights because it expanded, rather than
restricted, the opportunity for public debate on the issues of the
18 7
day.
The most frequently cited nonsubsidy case is Regan v. Taxation With
Representation.l18 In Taxation With Representation, the Court viewed
tax exemptions as subsidies which Congress was free to withhold
without harm to the exempted organization's right to lobby.18 9 The
Court held unanimously that the IRS's anti-lobbying conditions
imposed on nonprofit organizations that wished to maintain their taxdeductible status were "content neutral" and did not "discriminate
invidiously" on the basis of viewpoint 90
In a more recent case, Lyng v. International Union," l the Court
held that the government's denial of food stamps to striking workers
did not unconstitutionally place the workers in the position of having
to choose between exercising their right to strike or receiving food
stamps." 2 The striking workers' disqualification from the food
stamp program simply reflected "Congress's judgment not to provide

184. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
185. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1976) (explaining that political candidate's personal
expenditures to support his or her candidacy could not be limited by government's interest in

preventing corruption).
186. Id. at 90-91 (allowing Congress to limit private contributions to campaigns if public
funding is accepted for promotion of general welfare, to reduce monetary influence, to facilitate
communication, and to reduce fundraising need). For a discussion of the impact of Rust on
current efforts to reform political campaign funding and the Buddey decision, see generally
Kenneth J. Levit, CampaignFinanceReform and the Return of Buckley v. Valeo, 103 YALE LJ.469
(1993).
187. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 52-53.
188. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
189. Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983); see also Cammarano
v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (holding that Congress is not required by First
Amendment to subsidize lobbying activities). In Taxation With Representation, the Court held that
a nonprofit organization could not engage in certain lobbying activities prescribed by Congress
with the use of tax deductible contributions. 461 U.S. at 544. The organization, however, could
establish a separate affiliate to conduct such lobbying activities funded by private contributions
that would not be deductible under the relevant statute. Id.
190. Taxation With Representation,461 U.S. at 548.
191. 485 U.S. 360 (1988).
192. Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360, 365-66 (1988).
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financial support to strikers."19 3 Finally, in Rust v. Sullivan,19 4 the
Court further extended its concept of nonsubsidies to encompass
funding restrictions on a recipient's speech within the scope of a
government-subsidized program so long as the recipient's freedom to
exercise fundamental rights outside the scope of the funded program
remained unimpeded. 95 In these nonsubsidy cases, the Court ruled
that the regulations did not prohibit or restrict a protected activity,
would, not pay for the
but simply provided that the government
1 96
activity as part of a subsidized program.
The penalty and nonsubsidy lines of case law have created
confusion over the application of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine to government-funded programs. The distinctions between
what constitutes a penalty and a nonsubsidy have become nearly
impossible to ascertain and seem more a matter of perspective than
substantive difference.
Previously, if funding criteria were content-based in a way that
generally restricted the recipient's speech, the Court would apply
strict scrutiny.197 Content-based conditions on speech, however, are
not always unconstitutional."9 8 If a compelling state interest can be
demonstrated and if the restriction is narrowly crafted to fit the state's
In practice, the
purpose, a court may uphold the restriction."
Court has divided content-based conditions into three categories:
viewpoint, subject matter, and artistic quality. With regard to
viewpoint-based conditions, the Court has almost always found them

193. International Union v. Lyng, 648 F. Supp. 1234, 1245 (D.D.C. 1986) (app.), revd 485
U.S. 360 (1988).
194. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
195. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-95 (1991) (stating that Congress may choose to fund
programs in public's interest without funding alternative or competing programs).
196. Id. at 203 (upholding federal funding of family planning services that failed to include
abortion as family planning method because individuals freedom of choice and access to
abortion was not impacted by adoption of governmental restrictions); Lyng, 485 U.S. at 370-73
(holding congressional limits of food stamp program for striking workers required Court's
deferential review and was rationally related to legitimate government goal even though strikers
and their families could not increase their food stamp receipts while on strike).
197. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny to city
ordinance forbidding picketing based on subject matter and group identity). Justice Marshall
wrote for the Court in Mosley that "above all else, the First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content." I&
198. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2545-46 (1992) (stating that prohibitions
on content-based restrictions apply differently to speech that may be proscribed than fully
protected speech).
199. See id. at 2548-50 (striking down city ordinance prohibiting "hate speech" because it was
not narrowly crafted); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (upholding CIA restrictions
on former agent who signed written agreement not to divulge classified information or publish
agency information without authorization).
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to violate the First Amendment. "° Generally, subject matter. condidons have been closely scrutinized by the Court, although with
somewhat less vigor than viewpoint-based conditions. °1 In the
realm of funding to the arts and the humanities, standards for artistic
quality have been found to meet constitutional muster."2 This
judicial tolerance for conditional funding rests in large part on the
finite resources available to the arts and the legislative intent which
encourages creativity, pluralism, and artistic merit. °3
Whether a funding condition is viewed as a penalty or as a
nonsubsidy has become increasingly a matter of distinguishing facts
that could fall within either category. The absence of a uniform rule
has made it difficult to discern a sharp line between a penalty and a
nonsubsidy, leading courts to case-by-case determinations. For
instance, in Taxation With Representation, the Court found contributions to nonprofit organizations used for lobbying were distinguishable from other activities. 2 The Court required these funds to be
segregated and accounted for separately under the auspices of an
affiliate in order for the principal organization to maintain its

200. See Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 226-28 (1987) (declaring state
sales tax imposed only on general interest magazines unconstitutionally discriminatory and
selective); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), aft'g771 F.2d 323,33132 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding anti-pornography ordinance unconstitutional because it promoted
one viewpoint over another); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 13-17
(1986) (holding requirement that electric utility enclose third party newsletter in its billing
envelope violated utility company's First Amendment speech rights by mandating imposition of
unwanted viewpoint).
201. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542, 2547 n.6. The Court invalidated a city ordinance that
prohibited otherwise permitted speech "solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses."
Id. at 2542. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia conceded "that presumptive
invalidity does not mean invariable invalidity, leaving room for such exceptions as reasonable
and viewpoint-neutral, content-based discrimination in nonpublic forums." Id. at 2547 n.6
(citations omitted).
202. See Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 575 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaining
that court must evaluate regulation of artistic expression by considering definition of artistic
form or category and standards used by government to determine if particular work falls within
category), cert. denied,471 U.S. 1054 (1985); cf. Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792,
797-98 (1st Cir.) (upholding denial of state arts grant to literary magazine on grounds that
Constitution did not warrantjudicial evaluation of standard used by governor), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 894 (1976).
203. See20 U.S.C. §§ 954(c) (1)-(2), 955(f), 959(a) (8) (1994) (authorizing NEA to selectively
support projects having substantial artistic and cultural significance, and not otherwise available
to public). The National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) similarly discriminate on the basis of content in order to allocate limited funding
resources to the most meritorious projects. See 42 U.S.C. § 1862 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(authorizing National Science Foundation to initiate and support scientific research and
development); id, § 241 (authorizing Secretary of Health and Human Services to assist and
cooperate with other public authorities and scientific institutions).
204. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (supporting taxdeductible status for contributions to nonprofit organizations that are used only for nonlobbying activities).
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nonprofit status under IRS regulations." 5 In contrast, a year later
in League of Women Voters, the Court found no distinction between
funds dedicated to editorializing and funds used for educational
programming." 6 Lobbying and editorializing are both protected
speech activities."0 7 A consistent application of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions would have protected both activities.
Obviously, this scenario did not occur.
The Court's decision in Rust further contributed to the confusion.
In Rust, the Court permitted viewpoint-based conditions on previously
upheld content-neutral restrictions when the conditions were confined
only to the project's scope. 0 ' The Court declared that as long as
the restriction was defined within the narrow terms of the project, and
not directed toward a particular grantee, the restriction passed
constitutional muster. 09 This decision confuses the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions because it opens the door to the
government carefully limiting the scope of the missions of the
programs it funds to specific activities, effectively permitting the
expression of only one viewpoint. 10 If a potential recipient objects
to the restriction, the recipient can simply go elsewhere for private
funding for the same activity. As long as the government does not
exercise a monopoly over that activity, the Court will uphold the
government's restrictions.2 ' Such a program, in practice, censors
other viewpoints by subsidizing only the favored viewpoint. Thus,
under Rust, federal funds for family planning programs could be
earmarked to promote only childbirth options without being
considered as viewpoint-discriminatory although other views could not
be admitted within the programs' narrowly defined scope.212
If such reasoning were applied to arts funding, a program narrowly
defined to promote only "decent" art would, in theory, pass constitu-

205. Id at 544.
206. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399-401 (1984).
207. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 381-84 (stating that free expression of editorial
opinion is at heart of First Amendment); Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 552
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that lobbying is protected by First Amendment (citing
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,137-38 (1961))).
208. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194-95 (1991) (stating that government may choose not
to fund activities outside scope of funded project).
209. Id. at 196-97.
210. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507 (1989) (holding that
government had no obligation to provide subsidy to constitutionally protected activity).
211. See Rust, 500 U.S.- at 201-02 (stating that government may refuse to subsidize
constitutionally protected activity as such refusal does not impede individual's ability to exercise
right elsewhere).
212. See id. at 197-98 (holding that government's funding of family planning services which
promoted only childbirth options did not require government to fund alternative options such
as right to abortion).
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tional muster. Whether such single purpose programs would
constitute a form of indirect content-based censorship or simply
sponsorship of a narrowly defined project is entirely unclear in view
of the Court's recentjurisprdence. The doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions in its pure form is too often ignored by the Court to make
such distinctions reliably.
A generally unacknowledged difficulty with the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions is that its simplicity and the seductive
logic of its essential argument generate practical applications that
exceed the Supreme Court's willingness or ability to implement the
fullest reach of the doctrine. Nevertheless, at least one scholar faults
the Court for not following a more consistent and vigorous application of the doctrine, but concedes that realistically the current
membership of the Court is not likely to alter its meandering
jurisprudence. 1 3 In effect, this view presumes that the constitutional theory predicates constitutional jurisprudence.
Others argue that further clarifications of the doctrine's tenets can
distinguish and resolve the Court's apparently erratic path through
2 14
constitutional challenges to restrictive governmental funding.
This latter approach brings to mind an exegesis in Ptolemaic
astronomy,21 so heavily encrusted with qualifications and considerations that it inevitably must collapse under its own weight. Instead,
a simpler, heliocentric model is needed. In this regard, several wellreasoned alternatives are available.

213. See Sullivan, supranote 11, at 1417-18 (noting that while unconstitutional conditions
doctrine needs to be applied more vigorously, Supreme Court chiefJustice Rehnquist does not
advocate such use).
214.

See Rodney A. Smolla, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 182-83 (1992) (stating that

unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides little guidance because challenge remains in
distinguishing between permissible and impermissible conditions); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational
Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1296-1304

(1984) (supporting further evaluation of allocational sanctions method to assess rights and
privileges distinction used in unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Albert J. Rosenthal,
ConditionalFederalSpendingandthe Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1106-07 (1987) (focusing

on relationship between powers of Federal Government and permissibility of conditional
spending to determine validity of government actions).
215. SeeWEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1835 (1986) (definingptolemaic
system as "the system of planetary motions according to which the earth is at the center with the
sun, moon, and planets revolving around it and each orbit except for the sun and moon is
composed of a principle circle upon which moves a smaller circle carrying the planet").
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C. Alternatives to the Doctrine of UnconstitutionalConditions
1.

Limiting government power to bargain with funding beneficiaries

An interesting alternative to the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions is simply to avoid the inherent difficulties of funding
regulations by limiting the scope of governmental activity to programs
that operate on the basis of a substantial consensus." 6 Using this
approach, known as the Pareto Optimality Principle,217 one inquires
whether the bargain offered by a government program benefits all
citizens or all affected parties in a positive fashion, or conversely,
whether any citizen is worse off than he or she was under the status
quo ante."8 If any individual benefits and no negative effects occur,
then the program satisfies its constituents and is socially justified.21 9
If the program's effect leaves some participants worse off, however few
in number they may be, the program is not socially justified and
should be abandoned.2 20
In this vein, Professor Richard Epstein argues that a bargaining by
consensus approach to the issue of restrictions on government
funding would render the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
unnecessary. 221 If a substantial consensus can be established for a
program's objectives, procedures, and ultimate results, there would be
no need for constitutional protection.2 22
Everyone would be
satisfied with the program's benefits. When a consensus among
potential beneficiaries, participants, and any other affected party

216. See EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 11, at 12 (advocating that
government should be limited in its power to regulate and contract only when substantial public
consensus exists).
217. SeeJules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509,
540-51 (1980) (arguing that Pareto Optimality Principle as applied to government programs is
too rigid to be practically or politically implemented).
218. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 11, at 8-9.
219. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 11, at 8-9.
220. SeeEPSTEIN, BARGAINING WTH THE STATE, supra note 11, at 8 (explaining that if program
leaves individuals worse off, then government should not fund it and individuals may choose to
enter into their own bargains which may leave them better off than before). This calculus
includes a consideration by which the beneficiary of the program might overcome a negative
effect on any party who is left worse off by the program through direct compensation and thus
create, by a secondary effort, a positive benefit for all, therebyjustifying the program under the
Pareto Principle. I& at 8.9.
1
221. EPSrEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 11, at 309-12 (arguing for reduced
governmental funding for education and arts because of lack of broad social consensus to
support such activities).
222. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 11, at 309 (commenting that arts
funding will be secure only so long as consensus exists in support of agency actions).
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cannot be reached, Epstein suggests that the government should
decline to create the program and leave it to private initiative or the
free market to resolve the perceived need.2"u The bargaining theory
assumes a before-and-after baseline to evaluate whether all parties to
the government's bargain gain from the transaction and whether the
bargain simultaneously respects the legitimate interests of third
parties. 224
The bargaining theory would limit the range of government

activity.2' The theory recognizes that a regulatory state, with its
manifold programs of taxes and subsidies, is inherently subject to
controversy.2 26 Such controversy is socially inefficient. 227 Consequently, avoiding government-funded programs that lack a political
consensus concerning their implementation or administration will
better serve the public interest. Rather than directly subsidizing a
controversial activity such as the arts, the bargaining approach would
leave it to the private sector and market forces to support the
activity.2 s Alternatively, the approach would allow governmental
support through selective and indirect means, such as tax exemptions
or credits, that subsidize parties who support a controversial activity,
but would remove the government from regulating the activity
itself.229 If these forms of indirect government subsidies nevertheless constrained the fundamental rights of any party to the activity, the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions would apply and the constraints would be strictly scrutinized by the courts.2 ° In practice,
the consensual bargaining theory could be viewed as unconstitutional
conditions applied to a preemptively small universe of government
activity.
The drawbacks to the consensual bargaining theory approach are
manifested in the difficulty of defining a threshold of consensus for
223. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 11, at 309-11 (suggesting that
government non-involvement in arts funding and programs eliminates danger of First

Amendment violations).
224. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supranote 11, at 97-98, 102.
225. See EPSTEIN, BARGAINING wrrm THE STATE, supra note 11, at 311-12 (arguing that if
government's bargaining powers are watched closely, then government activities based on this
power will be limited).
226. SeeEPSTEIN, BARGAINING WIrH THE STATE, supranote 11, at 4-5 (outlining risks associated
with government's unbridled power to bargain with individuals who waive their constitutional
rights).
227. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 11, at 13, 33.

228. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supra note 11, at 312.
229. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WIrH THE STATE, supranote 11, at 240-51.
230. See EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WrrH THE STATE, supra note 11, at 101-03 (stating that
unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not allow state to coerce, pressure, or induce waiver
of constitutional rights in order for individual- to receive government offered benefit or
privilege).
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a given program. What constitutes a consensus? At what point in
public debate does disagreement or vigorous dissent dissolve a
consensus? As most funding programs are created by a political
decision, the test for initial consensus would seem to be a simple
majority vote. 231 As conditions and priorities change within the
political landscape, decisions to expand, maintain, or eliminate such
programs will be made by elected officials according to their
perceptions of public sentiment. Yet, many programs have so little
public input or identity that they call the consensual model into
question.3 2 Furthermore, many public initiatives that began amidst
great controversy or uncertainty, have since become icons of universal
support, examples include Social Security, Medicare, and government
funding of national parks. Other programs of substantial merit that
started with broad public support have since withered, such as
agricultural subsidies, public housing, prohibition, and the sale of
public lands. As a practical and political matter, the public's desire
for government involvement in many aspects of economic and private
activities is simply too strong to be constrained by a vague requirement of consensus before program implementation.
As political decisions are made to create programs and their
attendant regulations, so too may political decisions modify or rescind
such programs. Any approach that seeks to evade the difficulties and
potential controversy of governmental funding restrictions by
eschewing them outright, unless supported by consensus, is politically
unrealistic. With limited public resources, various constituencies will
inevitably fight against some programs, and support other programs
favorable to their own interests, as a matter of self-preservation.3 3
As a measure for discretionary governmental action, consensus is too
difficult to reckon in the whorl of practical politics. Compromise and
accommodation are the more likely pattern for discretionary

231.
A simple majority vote is necessary for the passage of most legislation. In many
legislative bodies, procedural rules, often of dubious constitutional validity, sometimes effectively
require a three-fifths majority vote, or even two-thirds, to overcome a "filibuster" or similar tactic
that impedes the passage of legislation.
232. For example, the public has very little input on government programs that involve
classified spending for national security agencies, such as the CIA, and other secret projects.
Many ordinary appropriations, often described as "pork," that are appended to legislation
without the opportunity for debate and separate voting, also involve a similar lack of public
input or identity.
233. The tendency to support some programs while opposing others is especially true in
times of declining revenues or budgets. For example, religious groups have lobbied for
governmental support for sectarian educational programs while opposing government subsidies
for family planning programs that include counseling for birth control or abortion.
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government action and the restrictions that inevitably accompany such

activity.
2. Spheres of neutrality
Another alternative to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
embodies a structural rather than a procedural approach to governmental regulation. Under a "spheres of neutrality" approach, one
examines the substance and the public purpose of a funded institution or individual in light of the potential for government funding,
with its attendant restrictions, to further or reduce the recipient's
unfettered ability to contribute to public debate in the marketplace
of ideas."a This approach seeks to resolve the Court's apparently
inconsistent decisions under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions..5 by establishing a different critical baseline that looks
at funded activities the Court has historically protected from
restrictions on fundamental rights.
Proponents of the spheres of neutrality approach argue that in a
non-neutral, political world, funding is inherently restrictive or, at the
least affirmatively discriminatory.2 6 Rather than proceed on a caseby-case examination of whether the regulations themselves are unduly
restrictive, as would occur under a conventional unconstitutional
conditions analysis, the structural spheres of neutrality approach
considers a regulation's potential to enhance or diminish the
recipient's ability to participate in public debate as the measure of
whether fundamental rights are harmed. 3 7 Under this approach
what is important is not whether regulatory provisions impinge on the
exercise of fundamental rights, but whether the defining function of
the recipient institution falls within a traditionally protected sphere
of liberty.2' The spheres of neutrality approach is retrospective and
results oriented. Institutions that the Court has declared to be
crucial to public discourse, such as traditional public forums, the

234. See Cole, supra note 11, at 681-82 (explaining that "spheres of neutrality" approach
would be better solution than unconstitutional conditions doctrine because new approach would
not be content-specific); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Selective FundingProblem: Abortions
and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REv. 989, 1047 (1991) (supporting application of consistent
methodology to determine whether government should fund specific programs).
235. See Cole, supra note 11, at 682 (explaining that new rationale is needed in Court's
review of selectively funded speech activities to replace unconstitutional conditions doctrine);
see also supra notes 197-215 and accompanying text (explaining Supreme Court's inconsistent
application of unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
236. See Cole, supra note 11, at 682.
237. See Cole, supra note 11, at 715-17 (arguing that structural approach would consider
regulated institution's role in public debate).
238. Cole, supranote 11, at 716.
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press, schools and universities, public libraries, and the arts, would be
subject only to content-neutral regulation of their activities, notwithstanding governmental funding.19 These institutions fall within a
protected spheres of neutrality.2" Other institutions, whose defining functions fall outside articulated spheres of neutrality, such as
welfare agencies and medical clinics, would not be similarly protected
until deemed so by the Supreme Court.241 In Rust, for example, the
Court found that the essential function of a medical clinic does not
embrace public debate traditionally protected under the First
Amendment. 24 2 In fact, many functions of a clinic involve activities
inconsistent with public discourse, for instance, the private and
intimate doctor-patient relationship.
A First Amendment analysis that focuses on spheres of neutrality
has the same general result as the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions-the protection of fundamental rights from government
domination or indoctrination through the guise of funding regulations. A spheres of neutrality analysis, however, measures the risk of
regulatory harm by different criteria. Under such an analysis, the
emphasis is on the restrictive effect of regulations on robust public
debate. 2' By emphasizing an institution's function and its relationship to public discourse, an analysis based on spheres of neutrality can
help reconcile the Court's seemingly contradictory decisions in
Taxation With Representation and League of Women Voters. 244 A spheres
of neutrality analysis would justify the IRS's scrupulous application of
a content-neutral denial of tax exemptions for deductions on
charitable gifts to nonprofit organizations that wish to lobby because
these organizations would remain free to lobby in an unrestricted and
239. Cole, supra note 11, at 736-38, 748.
240. Cole, supra note 11, at 736.
241. See Cole, supranote 11, at 716 (stating that those functions not falling within protected
spheres do not require neutral governmental support).
242. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199-200 (1991) (stating that governmental funding of
family planning clinics does not implicate First Amendment protections related to public
debate).
243. Cole, supra note 11, at 736-38. Cole suggests a three-prong analysis to determine
whether the government may impose First Amendment restrictions on funding beneficiaries:
First, the Court should ask whether government control of the content of speech in
the institution would be threatening to a vigorous public debate or to the autonomy
of the listeners; second, the Court should ask whether the internal operation of the
institution is consistent with a First Amendment neutrality mandate; and third, where
non-neutrality poses a threat to free speech values, but strict neutrality would impede
the institution's internal functioning, the Court should ask whether the independence
of the speakers can be structurally accommodated in some intermediate fashion.
Id at 736.
244. See Cole, supranote 11, at 687-88, 716, (stating that Court's application of unconstitutional conditions doctrine, as illustrated in Rust, has led to misapplication of principles set forth
in Taxation With Repreentation and preceding cases).
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unfettered manner."
The IRS's offer of a tax deduction can be
viewed simply as a nonsubsidy to those groups that choose to lobby.
By the same token, under a spheres of neutrality analysis the Court's
determination in League of Women Voters, that an FCC prohibition on
all editorial programming by public broadcasting stations was
constitutionally incompatible with the principle of free expression, is
consistent because the government sought to regulate a major
medium of public discourse in a content-discriminatory fashion.246
When activities of the institution are less crucial to public debate,
funding restrictions would be scrutinized less strictly.247 For example, government programs that distribute food stamps or government
subsidies to institutions, such as private welfare agencies, whose
primary functions are not essential to public discourse, would undergo
a more deferential review. Non-neutral bases for support would be
acceptable to these institutions if rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose. This analysis justifies the Court's decisions to
uphold funding restrictions in Lyng and Rust because the respective
institutions concerned, a federal agricultural agency and private family
planning services, did not purposefully function within an arena of
public debate protected by the First Amendment.2"
A significant advantage of a spheres of neutrality analysis is that it
moves the discussion about funding conditions away from case-specific
analyses toward the broader perspective of an institution's purpose
and role within the sphere of public discourse. This perspective will
provide the Court with more accurate guidance concerning regulatory
infringements of fundamental rights.249 Most importantly, a spheres
of neutrality analysis offers a methodology that can more effectively
accommodate both the recipient's fear of undue government

245. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983) (holding that
Congress has discretion to subsidize selectively certain organizations or activities in public
interest).
246. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 381-84 (1984) (holding that
restriction on editorial opinions was unconstitutional because it violated right to express political
views).
247. Cole, supranote 11, at 716.
248. See Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360, 365-67 (1988) (holding that Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act's refusal to extend or increase new food stamp benefits to striking
workers did not infringe First Amendment because Act did not prevent any individuals from
dining together and did not infringe on associational rights); see also Cole, supra note 11, at
743-47 (advocating application of spheres of neutrality analysis to professional fiduciary
counseling because such counseling implicates fundamental rights). But cf Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 219 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The manipulation of the doctor-patient
dialogue ... is clearly an effort 'to deter a woman from making a decision that, with her
physician, is hers to make.' As such it violates the Fifth Amendment." (citations omitted)).
249. See Cole, supra note 11, at 715-16 (stating that Court could avoid making elusive
distinctions and case-by-case determinations by use of more structural approach).
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restriction and domination over the recipient's activities, and the
government's desire to promote activities for the public good.5 0 By
examining the role that the recipient institution plays in the marketplace of ideas and the functional means by which the institution
accomplishes its objectives, a rationale can be developed that protects
fundamental rights, where appropriate, without imposing the onerous
requirement of neutral treatment for every case of restricted funding.

III. THE ARTS AND TRADITIONALLY PROTECTED FORMS OF
EXPRESSION

The body of constitutional jurisprudence covering artistic expression is surprisingly meager. This paucity of constitutional jurisprudence is due, in part, to the infrequency of litigation over rights
inherent to artistic expression."'1 Typically, artistic expression has
raised constitutional issues only when the content or presentation of
the art is obscene or somehow so seriously disturbing to those
exposed to it that the government has taken action to remove or
prohibit the offending object from public view.252 A question that
necessarily precedes the issue of whether it is within the government's
authority to take such action is a determination of the constitutional
status of art.
Speech that bears a political content has long been accorded the
highest level of judicial scrutiny.25
Speech that informs or that
communicates religious thought is accorded similar protection. 54
The purely aesthetic attributes of artistic expression, however, have a
less certain status than political or informative speech. From a legal
point of view, the hybrid nature of artistic speech may have caused
this phenomenon. On the one hand, art informs its audience by its
presentational form and technique.255 Art critics have asserted that

250. Cole, supra note 11, at 747-49.
251. For a general overview of modem jurisprudence relating to artistic expression, see
RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLEGrORS, INVESTORS,
DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 315-23 (1989); Leonard D. Duboff, What isArt?: Toward a LegalDefinition,
12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENr. LJ.303 (1990), reprintedin 23 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 555, 602-03
(1991) (concluding that law has not yet developed single universal definition of what constitutes
art); Robert M. O'Neil, Artistic Freedom and Academic Freedom, 53 lAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177,
177-82 (1990) (describing fine arts' lack of First Amendment protection).
252. See generally infra Part III.2.A.
253. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (stating that debate on public issues
should be "uninhibited, robust and wide open").
254. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)
(commenting that "t]he free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe
and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires").
255. See SUSANNE K. LANGER, PROBLEMS OF ART 13-26 (1957) (explaining that art's
expressiveness is determined by its form).
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even the most abstract fonnulation may convey powerful messages to
its audience.25 6 On the other hand, an art work may simply be
intended to entertain its audience, unaccompanied by the communication of any discernible ideas or viewpoints. An additional issue
arises in cases where the elements of an art form are essentially nonverbal but contain images that nevertheless disturb or offend, such as
nude dancing or photographs of genitalia. 5
Because the nonverbal characteristics of the expression tend to remove it from
paradigmatic speech, such as expressions of political belief that would
ordinarily be afforded FirstAmendment protection, the artistic activity
is seen less like conventional "speech" and more like commercial or
professional activity, which the courts traditionally accord less
protection.2 58
Because the courts have heard only occasional cases, general
principles of First Amendment protection for artistic expression have
developed in a piecemeal and haphazard fashion, often one artistic
medium at a time.259 While the Supreme Court has developed a
fairly clear body of case law related to what constitutes legally obscene
speech, it has not yet enunciated a clear standard for what constitutes
"serious artistic value" under the test laid out in Miller v. California,2 ° which was an attempt to delineate work that may be properly
subjected to state regulation.
Moreover, other issues remain
problematic. For example, should the communicative intention in
the art work itself or of its presenter bear, in any way, on the degree
of constitutional protection accorded to a work of art? 61 The

256. ld. at 20.
257. See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expressionand Aesthetic Theoy: The Beautifu, the Sublime
and theFirstAmendment; 1987 Wis. L. REV. 221, 247-49 (citingjudicial hostility to offensive speech
where courts have accorded less value and protection to such works); see also Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 570 (1991) (upholding restrictions on nude dancing and finding
nude dancing only marginally protected as form of expressive conduct); Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932-33 (1975) (explaining that some forms of non-verbal expression, such

as nude dancing, may be entitled only to minimum First Amendment protection).
258. See Serra v. General Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1050 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that
government's relocation of sculpture purchased from private individual did not violate First
Amendment).
259. O'Neil, supranote 251, at 180.
260. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Millertest asks:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would
find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;

(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law;, and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or

scientific value.
Id at 24 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
261. See Pamela Weinstock, Note, The NationalEndowmentfor the Arts Funding Controversy and
the Miller Test: A Pleafor the Reuniflcation of Art and Society, 72 B.U. L. REV. 803, 820-22 (1992)
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paucity of case law on these points, however, ought not deter one
from finding that extensive constitutional protection should be
accorded to art as a form of speech.
A.

Artistic Expression and the First Amendment

Although the Supreme Court has never fully defined the scope of
First Amendment protection for the fine or performing arts, it has
enunciated a number of useful principles. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson,262 the Court struck down a New York statute that banned
"sacrilegious" motion pictures. 3
A unanimous Court held that
"expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free
speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."2" In dicta, the Court set forth salient criteria that would
apply to any artistic media. First, motion pictures, like all art, are a
"significant medium for the communication of ideas."2" Second,
the Court suggested that regardless of the manner in which these
ideas take form, either through particular political or social doctrines
or through subtle shades of thought, artistic expression, by its nature,
contains the communication of such ideas. 2" The Court in Burstyn
declared that whether such motion pictures were intended to inform
did not lessen their importance as an expression
or simply entertain
2 67
of public opinion.
Later, in Poe v. Ullman,21 Justice Douglas, writing in dissent on
other issues, echoed the reasoning in Burstyn when he asserted that
artists in both the fine and performing arts "are [the] beneficiaries of
freedom of expression.2 69 In addition, in Sweezy v. New HampshireY Justice Frankfurter noted that just as the educational system
requires that government tolerate the free exchange of ideas, a
similar "sense of freedom is also necessary for creative work in the
27 1

arts."

The Supreme Court's holdings in the area of obscenity have also
contributed to an understanding of the meaning and breadth of First

(advocating that value of art should be measured according to standards in Miller test).
262. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
263. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952).
264. Id at 502.
265. 1& at 501.
266. See id.
267. Id.
268. 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (plurality opinion).
269. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 514 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
270. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
271. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Amendment protection for artistic expression.272 For instance, the
Court in Miller stated that judgments "in the area of freedom of
speech and press... must always remain sensitive to any infringement
on genuinely serious literary, artistic, political or scientific expression."273 Although the context of the Court's reasoning is the
prohibition of obscene speech, the explicit inclusion of serious literary
and artistic work as co-equal to political and scientific expression
speaks strongly for the protected status of artistic expression.2 74
While some lines must be drawn, one could fairly conclude on this
basis that a work of any "serious" artistic expression falls within the
First Amendment.
Yet, anomalies exist within the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
obscenity subsequent to Miller that point out the absence of a clear
declaration that artistic expression is speech for constitutional
2" the
purposes. In New York v. Ferber,
Court upheld a state child
pornography law that forbid the knowing promotion, creation, and
distribution of materials showing children under the age of sixteen
engaging in sexual performances.
Although the Court's opinion
did not explicitly distinguish material prohibited under the New York
statute from "genuinely serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
expression,"2 7 the distinction appears plausible.27
The case in which the Supreme Court has come closest to
enunciating First Amendment protection for artistic expression is
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad.279 In Southeastern Promotions,
the Court invalidated the exclusion of Hair,a musical production,
from a public auditorium."' The Court noted that the facts of the
case would allow the Court to overturn the exclusion on strictly
procedural grounds "if [the Court] were to conclude that live drama
is unprotected by the First Amendment-or subject to a totally

272. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975) (holding that nude dancing
under certain circumstances may be entitled to First Amendment protection).
273. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
274. In the obscenity proceedings against a Cincinnati gallery for exhibiting the
Mapplethorpe photographs, there was strong testimony on the artistic quality of the photographs
which weighed heavily in the acquittal of the gallery and its director. O'Neil, supra note 251,
at 179.
275. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
276. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773-74 (1982).
277. Id.
278. See O'Neil, supra note 251, at 179 (proposing that works deemed "art' cannot also be
obscene because "the very notion of constitutionally unprotected art may be logically
untenable").
279. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
280. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561-62 (1975).
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different standard from that applied to other forms of expression."2 ' While none of the Justices suggested that a dramatic
production should be viewed as anything but a protected expression,
the Court added that "[e]ach medium of expression, of course, must
be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it,
for each may present its own problems." 2 Without further guidance from the Court, this dicta remains somewhat troubling. An art
form that does not primarily use the printed or spoken word in its
expression could conceivably enjoy less protection under the First
Amendment. The Court, however, did declare in Ward v. Rock Against
Racism? that, "[m]usic, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment."281
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit seemed to
rely on this case-by-case premise in Close v. Lederle.28 In Close, an art
exhibit, initially endorsed by the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst, was ordered dismantled by the school administration
because the displayed paintings were deemed inappropriate for a welltraveled corridor.28' The district court held in favor of the artist
who claimed that the school's order violated his First Amendment
rights.28 7 The court found that the exhibition was protected speech

because the artist followed all procedural requirements of the
university, the display area was in a public forum, and the art work
was not inappropriate.2 8 On appeal, the First Circuit reversed the
decision noting that the paintings were "merely art" and lacked the
necessary content that would place them within the same category of
protection afforded to campus speakers who express political or social
thought 28 9 Because the art lacked a political message or theme, the
First Circuit was willing to grant the administration considerable
deference in deciding the appropriate criteria for displaying or
29 °
removing works of art from its gallery.

281. Id. at 557.
282. Id.
283. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
284. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (holding that content-neutral
time, place, and manner restrictions on volume of amplification of rock concert are valid).
285. 424 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970).
286. Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d 988, 990 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970).
287. Close v. Lederle, 303 F. Supp. 1109, 1112 (D. Mass. 1969), rev'd, 424 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.
denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970).
1970), cert.
288. Id. at llll-12.
289. Close, 424 F.2d at 990.
290. Id.
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More recently, in Piarowski v. Illinois Community College District
515,291 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that unless the artistic expression falls within the legal definition
of obscenity, it is protected by the First Amendment. 92 The facts
in Piarowskiwere nearly identical to those in the Close case with one
crucial difference. In Piarowski, a state college chose to move an
exhibit of paintings to another campus gallery rather than to
dismantle it.293 The court ruled that the college could control the
time, place, and manner of an exhibit within reasonable limits without
violating the First Amendment rights of the exhibitor." 4 While the
school could relocate the exhibit, the public had the right of
reasonable access to view the work in its alternate location. 295 To
ban a work, once properly accepted by the state for exhibition, may
amount to an impermissible censorship of the artist's freedom of
speech.296 In this sense, Piarowski can be read to imply that once
the government, or its surrogate, has chosen to act with its "public
face" toward a work of art, it must accord the arts the status of
protected speech.
Other case law supports the general notion that artistic expression
is protected speech. In Sefick v. City of Chicago,297 a federal district
court held that "the art form in this case constitutes speech within the
meaning of the First Amendment and thus is entitled to constitutional
protection.
In Sefick, the art work at issue was a sculptural
installation at Chicago City Hall that consisted of unflattering
depictions of local political figures. 2 ' The court drew heavily on
the holding in Southeastern Promotions°° and held that the element
of political caricature would entitle the work to protection regardless

291. 759 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1007 (1985).
292. Piarowski v. Illinois Community College Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 627 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1007 (1985).
293. RL at 630.
294. Id at 629-30; see also Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)

(upholding time, place, and manner restrictions on speech activities of adult bookstores and
movie theaters).
295. See Piarowski 759 F.2d at 630 (declaring that all rooms of gallery must be viewed as one
forum, and as such, changing exact location within forum is less menacing to artistic freedom
than decision to exclude it altogether).
296. See id.at 632 (suggesting that preventing employee from displaying art anywhere on
campus may chill future desire to create art).

297. 485 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. 111.1979).
298. Sefick v. City of Chicago, 485 F. Supp. 644, 648 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
299. MLat 646-48 (involving sculptures of judges and city transportation authorities that
satirized local government policies).
300. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552 (1975) (holding that
municipal board's rejection of theater group's application to present musical Hairin city-leased
theater constituted impermissible prior restraint).
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of its medium."0 ' In another case, Brown v. Board of Regents,"°2 a
federal district court overruled the University of Nebraska's ban on a
scheduled showing ofJean-Luc Goddard's HailMary, a contemporary
film depiction of Christ's birth. 3 The university banned the film
in response to complaints from the community that the film was
blasphemous and sacrilegious.?° In staying the university's ban, the
court in Brown reasoned that -action taken by the state "merely to
avoid controversy from the expression of ideas is an insufficient basis
for interfering with the right to receive information.""0 5 The court
cited both the academic setting of the film's showing and the film's
artistic content to find that the film was protected under the First
Amendment. 6 It is worth noting that the medium of film had by
that point in time received substantial First Amendment protection.3o7
308
More recently, in Bella Lewitsky Dance Foundation v. Frohnmayer,
a federal district court held that certification requirements proscribing
the use of NEA funds for obscene purposes were unconstitutionally
vague and an infringement on the artist's exercise of free speech."0 9
The court pointed out that the NEA's certification requirements
would have a two-fold chilling effect. First, the certification requirement would temper artistic expression for fear that the NEA might
find the work obscene. 310 Second, prospective recipients would risk
the harm of losing the substantial imprimatur that NEA support
carries with other private sources of funding should they refuse to
certify their work, leaving them worse off for not accepting the NEA's
conditions.3 1' The court in Bella Lewitsky Dance Foundation equated
artistic expression with First Amendment speech and cited the
decision in Speiserto affirm that "free speech may not be so inhibited"
312
by a vague oath.

301. See Sefick, 485 F. Supp. at 648 n.11 (stating that several prior cases, including Southeastern
Promotions,have expanded definition of protected speech beyond "mere oral expression").
302. 640 F. Supp. 674 (D. Neb. 1986).
303. Brown v. Board of Regents, 640 F. Supp. 674, 675 (D. Neb. 1986).
304. Id at 676.
305. Id at 679.
306. M at 681.
307. Id; see alsoJoseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (concluding that
motion pictures are within reach of First Amendment protection).
308. 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
309. Bella Lewitsky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 782 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
310. Id. at 784-85.
311. Id at 783.
312. Id. at 782-83 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
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These three decisions set the stage for the federal district court's
holding in Finley v. NEA3 13 that content-based denials of funding to
the arts violated the First Amendment. 14 In 1990, the NEA rejected
the grant applications of four controversial performance artists for
failing to meet the "decency" clause requirement in the NEA's
application. 15 The artists brought suit attacking the "decency"
clause as a facially unconstitutional violation of free speech. 316 The
district court invalidated the decency clause because it allowed NEA
officials to determine eligibility for NEA grants using content-based
criteria."' Because of the inherent subjectivity of'such a standard,
the clause violated the Fifth Amendment's due process requirement.318 While the decency clause did proscribe "obscene" speech,
the clause could also suppress permissible forms of speech, including
"indecent" speech. 19 The court in Finley recognized that in light of
Rust and other recent Supreme Court decisions, the government
could regulate certain forms of government-funded speech activities. 2 ' The court, however, noted that certain "protected" areas of
speech, such as public speech made in academic settings, may not be
suppressed by the withdrawal of government funding.3 21 The court
further declared that because academic speech and artistic expression
reached "the core of a democratic society's cultural and political
vitality," arts funding demanded government neutrality with respect

313. 795 F. Supp. 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1992). The Finley case remains on appeal to the Ninth
Circuit. Jacqueline Trescott, NEA to Pay 4DeniedArt GrantsBut Deceny'Rule ChallengeUnresolved,
WASH. Posr, June 5, 1993, at DI.
314. Finley v. NEA, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1475 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
315. Id. at 1463 n.15 (explaining that under 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) application evaluations
may consider whether art form conforms to "general standards of decency and respect for the
diverse beliefs and values of the American public").
316. Id. at 1472. Originally, the suit also claimed violations of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §
522(a) (1994), and that the chairman failed to follow established decisionmaking procedures
in denying the artists' funding. Trescott, supra note 313, at D1. This portion of the suit was
eventually settled out of court, the NEA agreeing to pay each artist the amount of his or her
denied grant plus $6000 for Privacy Act violations as well as all legal fees. Id. The settlement
did not affect the portion of a pending appeal disputing the constitutionality of the decency
clause. I&
317. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1475.
318. Id. at 1471 (explaining that vagueness of terms impermissibly allows "arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement").
319. Id. at 1476; see Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (holding that
'expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978) ("[P]rurient appeal is an element of the obscene, but
the normal definition of 'indecent' merely refers to non-conformity with accepted standards of
morality.").
320. SeeFinley, 795 F. Supp. at 1463 (stating that decision in Rust reaffirmed well-established
rule that applicants have no "right" to governmental subsidy and that government may deny
awarding grants for any number of reasons).
321. Id.at 1475.
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to content.3 22 In effect, the Finley decision affirmatively established
a newly protected First Amendment interest: government-funded art.
In the above cases, the courts readily acknowledged the speech-like
status of artistic expression. Because most of these cases involved
expressive content of a political or religious nature, the courts found
it convenient to rely on well-established First Amendment jurisprudence that protected such subject matter, rather than to focus
definitively on the artistic medium as sufficient in itself to justify full
Other litigation has considered tangentially the
protection. a
constitutional protection afforded artistic expression through the
exception to the obscenity rule.324 Although there are almost no
suggestions in case law or scholarship that the arts are any less
deserving of full protection under the First Amendment than political
or religious speech, the natural inclination of the courts is to rely on
well-established principles of political or religious freedom as the
paradigm of privileged speech.
A consequence of this practical jurisprudence is that artistic
expression has yet to receive unqualified protection as a form of First
Amendment speech. The absence of a definitive declaration that art
is categorically as deserving of protection as traditionally protected
forms of speech may produce inconsistencies. For example, a crudely
drawn political cartoon or graffiti may be given First Amendment
protection, while a universally admired work of art that lacks a specific
political or religious content may not receive similar protection. Such
a distinction over content leads to the inference that art makes less of
a contribution to the civic and cultural values of society than do
politics or religion. 31 Countless examples exist of non-democratic
societies that have officially censored artistic expression in fear of art's
communicative power and illustrate that this inference is untena3 26
ble.

322. Id at 1473.
323. See supra note 297-307 and accompanying text (analyzing court decisions finding that
satirical sculptures of political figures and film depiction of Christ's birth were protected forms
of artistic expression).
324. See Weinstock, supra note 261, at 807-09 (describing successful applications of Miller
test's third prong to cases where materials deemed to be of"serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value" survived obscenity test).
325. Cf Ellen T. Harris, It Takes Practiceand Serious Thought to Learn How to Dislike Art Properly,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 19, 1990, at A56 ("[A]rt moves your emotions or makes you
think.... Disliked art and art with disliked subjects can be as powerful as liked art, sometimes
more powerful. It deserves both our attention and our protection.").
326.

See generallyMOSHE CARMILLY-WEINBERGER, FEAR OF ART: CENSORSHIP AND FREEDOM OF

EXPRESSION INART (1986) (describing art censorship from ancient times to present day).
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B. A ProtectedSphere
Democratic societies are also cautious about the communicative
power of art. This wariness usually manifests itself as an unwillingness
to support, through public funds, artistic activity that produces
disturbing or offensive material. While the government is under no
mandate to fund art of any sort, when it decides to subsidize an
artistic endeavor, it has a constitutional duty to operate as it would
toward any other form of speech. Therefore, the government must
act without the imposition of prior restraints or other restrictions that
would suppress or distort the speaker's voice.3 27 Artistic expression
logically exists in the sphere of protected speech embodied in the Bill
of Rights and enforced through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Thus, the case for constitutional protection of the arts is
compelling. To promote free and robust debate on issues facing the
community, the individual, the group, and the state, freedom to
express thoughts and ideas on any subject and by any appropriate
means must exist.32"
All forms of communication, particularly
artistic expression but also scientific and scholarly expression, 9
must be protected regardless of whether some may find the message
unwise, disagreeable, or offensive. In this sense, the arts inhabit the
traditional sphere of free expression protected by constitutional law
against the vicissitudes of governmental control.

327. See, e.g.,Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,229-31 (1987) (holding
unconstitutional state sales tax scheme that taxed certain periodicals while exempting others
based on content); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,386-87 (1984) (striking down
federal statute prohibiting expression of editorial opinions by public television stations as
impermissible restriction on speech); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967)
(finding the requirement of loyalty oaths by public school teachers unconstitutional).
328. For example, authors from Harriet Beecher Stowe to Norman Mailer, whose writings
depend upon allusion and metaphor to comment on contemporary matters, are often best able
to communicate their ideas when not speaking in express political terms. See generally HARRIET
BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN (Alfred Knopf ed. 1995) (1851); NORMAN MAILER, THE
ARMIES OFTHE NIGHT (1968); NORMAN MAILER, WHYARE WE IN VIETNAM (1967). The Paintings
of Ben Shahn (e.g., Sacco and Vanzetti), Robert Indiana (e.g., Alabama), and Picasso (e.g.,
Guernica)depended on a like technique of artistic treatment and pictorial allusion to move their
audiences on important issues of their day, such as anarchism, racism, and war, respectively.
Indeed, our greatest and most beloved leaders have been superb storytellers: Benjamin
Franklin, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill.
329. See William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and theFirstAmendment in the Supreme Court
of the United States: An UnhurriedHistoricalReview, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 152 (1990)
(chronicling history of academic freedom in United States).
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IV. THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING OF THE ARTS: FOUR
OPTIONS

Although the recent controversies surrounding federal funding to
the arts may have temporarily faded from the public's attention, they
were headed toward another noisy congressional review when
appropriations for the NEA came up for consideration during the
104th Congress. Joining the usual calls to curtail overall government
spending by the Republican-controlled Congress, were all the old
complaints against NEA sponsorship of indecent or inappropriate
artistic enterprises." In view of the growing jurisprudence supporting the First Amendment right to artistic expression,"' interest
inevitably turned toward better methods to regulate the disbursement
of government funds in order to avoid past controversies.
In the past, courts have invalidated clumsy efforts to preempt
federal support of potentially obscene or indecent works of art by
Congress and the NEA's director.33 2 Moreover, any future efforts
involving 'decency' oaths or other content-based requirements to
regulate artistic expression by grantees are likely to be invalidated.
Rather than repeat the same battles between intransigent parties to
the old controversies, a more appropriate and useful approach would
be to review the purpose and desirability of federal and all government funding to the arts in order to ascertain the value of subsidies
to the grantees and the benefit to the public from increased exposure
to art as a result of government funding.

Although admittedly cliche within political commentary, a fair and
constant question is whether an investment in the arts justifies the
return in terms of the use of tax revenues drawn from all quarters of

330. Congressman Dick Armey (R-Tex.) who led much of the House opposition to the NEA
funding debate in 1989 and 1990 is the new Majority Leader in the 104th Congress. Although
Republicans made no mention of the NEA or the arts in their "Contract with America," which
seems to be the overwhelming political focus of the 104th Congress, the new Congress has
already indicated that funding for the NEA, National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH),
and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting will come under close scrutiny. See Robert Pear,
A Hostile House Trains Its Sights on FundsforArts, N.Y. TIMEs,Jan. 9,1995, at Al (quoting House
Republican leaders as advocating elimination of or severe reduction in NEA budget).
331. See supra notes 251-326 and accompanying text (enumerating principles defining
breadth and scope of First Amendment protections of artistic expression).
332. See Finley v. NEA, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1475 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that NEA's
invocation of "decency" clause to deny artists' grant applications constitutes suppression of
speech); Bella Lewitsky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 782 (C.D. Cal. 1991)
(holding invalid NEA requirement that grant recipients certify that funds will not be used "to
promote or produce obscene materials").
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3 3 Are these
the population."
programs efficiently productive in both
artistic output and public intake? Another consideration is the degree

of popular support and demand for the various funded projects. If
there is or has been controversy over certain funding projects, is the

controversy a matter of general public concern or a case of the
heckler's veto?" s Finally, is there a coherent set of policy priorities
that government funding seeks to accomplish and have these

priorities been achieved? Although most of these questions are
routinely reached in agency requests for appropriations, the purpose
here is to examine them in light of the foregoing discussion of
spheres of free expression and the selectivity or restrictiveness with

which the government may promote vigorous public expression on
the issues of the day. The following options are intended to cover a
wide range of policy approaches to future government funding of the
arts and to sketch out plausible directions that such funding might
take.
A.

Eliminate All Government Subsidies to the Arts

Although rather extreme in its form and not likely to occur, 3 5
the option of eliminating all forms of federal support to the arts is
worth some consideration if for no other reason than to consider its
negative implications. This approach would guarantee that the
government would no longer fund controversial projects. But using
such a sweeping approach to solve a small number of relatively
isolated problems is like throwing the baby out with the bath water.

333. See supra notes 216-33 and accompanying text (discussing bargaining-by-consensus
approach which advocates leaving support for arts to private sector).
334. See, e.g., In reKay, 464 P.2d 142, 147 (Cal. 1970) ("Audience activities, such as heckling,
interrupting, harsh questioning, and booing, even though they may be impolite and
discourteous, can nonetheless advance the goals of the First Amendment."). The theory that
the government may censor or ban the speaker in order to avoid public disorder or discontent
with a speaker is a double-edged sword. On one hand, there is the need to protect the public
from imminent harm, but on the other there is the temptation to use the heckler's threat of
disorder as a convenient means to squelch the protected right to express unpopular views. See
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 6 (1949) (finding unconstitutional conviction of individual
for political speech that aroused discontent or public unrest); supra notes 302-07; see also Brown
v. Board of Regents, 640 F. Supp. 674, 681 (D. Neb. 1986) (invalidating university action to
prohibit film showing as result of public pressure to ban allegedly sacrilegious film).
335. Vigorous attempts in the 104th Congress to terminate the NEAfailed despite concerted
efforts by the new Republican leadership. SeeMichael Kilian, Senate Vote Keeps ArtsFundingAliv,
OHi. TmB., Aug. 10, 1995, at 3 (describing compromise reached by Senate that would reduce
NEA's budget but save arts funding from House-approved elimination); David Rogers, House
Rejects Bid to End US. Fundsfor NationalEndomentfor the Arts, WALL ST.J.,July 18, 1995, at A16
(reporting 337-79 vote in House rejecting elimination of arts funding by end of 1996); Trescott,
supranote 90, at C1 (describing how $150 of NEA funding for one-night performance of artist
who carved design into back of another artist caused Congress to threaten 5% cut in NEA
budget).
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The elimination of federal funding to the NEA, for example, would
save $170 million, or approximately 68 cents per citizen. 3 6 But in
terms of the quality of service, the cost to the public would be high.
The number of grantees is quite large while the number of staff that
administers the NEA is relatively small for an agency of its funding
size and scope. 3 7 This relatively small staff can be attributed in
large part to the fact that significant numbers of quasi-volunteers serve
on the NEA's advisory panels.ss
In terms of total dollars disbursed by the NEA, state and municipal
arts agencies, which directly received approximately thirty-five percent
of all funds granted by the NEA, would lose the most if the NEA were
abolished."3 9 The NEA allocated less than five percent of its funds
directly for career development grants and project-specific subsidies
to individual artists.3 ° Private institutions with local, regional, and
national identities are the second largest category of NEA grantees
and receive roughly thirty-two percent of all NEA disbursed funds.3 4 1
The remaining balance of NEA funding grants are disbursed to
programs in arts education. 342 For every dollar allocated by the
NEA, approximately twelve dollars are distributed from state, regional,
and local arts agencies, private foundations, corporations, businesses,
and individual citizens.3
Most complaints regarding funded projects that offended standards
of public decency have been directed toward grants to individual
artists, such as the career development grants made to Andres
Serrano' and Karen Finley.35 A smaller number of complaints
concern private institutions that received federal grants to support
broad-based institutional activities such as exhibitions, performances,
or publications.3 6 For example, the Corcoran Gallery in Washington, D.C., originally sponsored, but then withdrew, an exhibition of

336. National Endowment for the Arts, FY 93 and FY 94 Budgets (table summary)
[hereinafter FY 93-94 Budgets] (on file with The American University Law Review); see also NEA,
THE ARTS IN AMERICA 1992: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS I-i (1992)
[hereinafter NEA, THE ARTS IN AMERICA].
337. See supra notes 58-65, 74 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (describing composition duties of NEA
advisory panels). Administrative costs of the NEA were less than 14% of the total budget in 1993
and 1994. FY 93-94 Budgets, supra note 336.
339.
340.

See NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, THE ARTS IN BRIEF, supra note 76.
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, THE ARTS IN BRIEF, supra note 76.

341.
342.

FY 93-94 Budgets, supra note 336.
FY 93-94 Budgets, supra note 336.

343.

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, AMERICA IN THE MAKING 5 (1995).

344.
345.
346.
1991).

See supra notes 3, 78.
See Finley v. NEA, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1462-63 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
See Bella Lewitsky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 775-76 (C.D. Cal.
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Robert Mapplethorpe's photography under an NEA threat that funds
allocated for future exhibitions might not be forthcoming."
Although state governments also face severe budgetary constraints, no
state has yet proposed to abolish or to reduce substantially its funding
to the arts."
The abrupt withdrawal of federal funding would have a three-fold
effect. First, it would eliminate a sizable portion of support to the
arts. For example, since 1978 an average of eleven percent of the
funding to non-profit arts organizations receiving NEA challenge
Loss of federal funding
grants came directly from the NEA.would also reduce the diversification of non-governmental fundraising
by arts organizations and individuals. It would remove the statutory
compulsion to seek out matching grants because the prestige of
federal support that attracts such private initiatives would be missing.
There is, after all, only one Federal Government.
Second, withdrawing federal funding for the arts would result in the
loss of a national presence and imprimatur in the development of the
arts. The success of the NEA rests in large part on its effort to
promote new but promising arts programs by giving them professional
recognition at the national level. Even though the actual dollar
amount of the NEA grant is usually a small percentage of the typical
grantee's budget, this recognition is a substantial factor in the
organization's ability to attract collateral funding from local and
regional sources. 350 Due in significant part to the NEA, the number
of arts organizations serving the nation has grown to over ten times
the number operating in 1966.51 Yet, over the last fifteen years, the
35 2
level of funding to the NEA has remained essentially unchanged,
while the rest of the federal budget has more than tripled in size." 3
By promoting the development of an arts infrastructure within local

347. SeeJohn Garvey, Black and White lmages 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 190-91 (1993)
(reviewing Corcoran Gallery debacle and other controversial art shows supported by NA
funding).
348. Total state agency funding surpassed NEA allocations in 1986 and continues to grow
at a steady, if slow, pace. NEA, THE ARTS IN AMERICA, supra note 336, at 11-7.
349. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 17, 65 (1994). Last year,
state legislatures as a group matched NEA funding to state arts agencies at a six to one ratio.
I& at 73.
350. See Bella Lewitsky DanceFound., 754 F. Supp. at 783, 785 (citing amicus brief of Theatre
Communications Group which called NEA grant awards "critical to the ability of artists and
companies to attract non-federal funding sources").
351. See NEA, THE ARTS IN AMERICA, supra note 336, at 11-2 to 11-17 (describing numerous
organizations which have grown and benefitted from 20 years of federal funding).
352. In Fiscal Year 1980, the NEA allocation was $154 million. NEA, 1965-1985: A BRIEF
CHRONOLOGY 37 (1986); FY 93-94 Budgets, supranote 336. In 1994, it was $170 million. FY
93-94 Budgets, supranote 336.
353. See OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET 17 (1995).
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and regional communities, federal support to the arts has initiated an
economic as well as artistic momentum. The growth in community
level investment in the arts not only enriches the cultural quality of
life but also reenforces the economic strength of the community.
Another important benefit to the arts community is the modest but
ongoing support of the NEA to prestigious institutions, such as the
Metropolitan Opera or the Minnesota Children's Theatre, that
deserve recognition for their unique contributions to the nation's
international status as a leader in the arts. If Congress eliminates
federal funding, these organizations would probably survive financially, but the loss of the special recognition implicit in the receipt of
NEA grants would amount to an embarrassing withdrawal of federal
support for organizations that are considered national treasures.
Finally, the enabling legislation of the NEA proclaimed that federal
support for the arts was essential to the promotion of this nation as
a "high civilization" and "world leader." 's In fact, the NEA has
contributed significantly to an unparalleled improvement in the
stature of American art and civilization throughout the world, such as
the international artistic dominance of American dance companies
since the 1960s. Abandoning the NEA's mandate would send a
terribly negative message both here and abroad about this country!s
values and priorities.
While the above discussion largely relies on policy ramifications to
justify continued support for the NEA, its relevance to the issue of
funding a small number of controversial but constitutionally protected
forms of artistic expression is important. The unpleasant results of a
few projects cannot reasonablyjustifyjeopardizing the enormous value
generated by the rest of the NEA. In effect, abolishing the NEA
would hold a respected institution hostage to the heckler's veto.311

While the basis for the allegations made by NEA's congressional
detractors against the controversial projects may have some merit, the
implication that other work of the NEA is similarly tainted is baseless.
Moreover, the question of whether congressional tastes and views
should influence the curtailment of other worthy projects, or even the
questioned project itself, is an issue that touches on constitutional
values as well as the proper role of the political process, which the
enabling legislation of 1965 sought to preempt. 5 6 A better Solution

354. Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-960 (1994).
355. See supra note 334 (explaining problems associated with censoring speech to avoid
public disorder or discontent with message of speaker).
356. 20 U.S.C. § 951 (establishing NEA as independent organization responsible for
advancement of arts and humanities).
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would avoid occasional unpleasant or marginal results from NEA
funding without the risk of the wholesale elimination of an otherwise
successful agency. In this regard, constitutional jurisprudence offers
a few interesting avenues for exploration.
B. Subsidize the Arts Through Tax Exemptions
One potential solution is to devise a scheme that substitutes tax
exemptions or credits for direct federal subsidies to the arts.3 57
Alternatively, such a scheme could apply to those particular projects
or programs within the NEA that seem to produce offending results.
This tax exemption model could offer more than a dollar for dollar
deduction on the donor's tax return. For example, the scheme could
provide an exemption at double or triple the amount actually
contributed, up to a declared maximum.5 s In either scheme, the
use of the tax incentives would indirectly continue federal subsidization of the arts through a benefit to the donor and in artistic areas
that have an established public support base. The revenue losses
likely to be incurred in excess of those already taken for charitable
contributions to the arts could be projected and calculated into the
actual amount of the deduction. Although it is beyond the scope of
this Article to develop these calculations fully, the concept of an
aggressively orchestrated tax policy in support of the arts has a
number of advantages over direct subsidies from a government
3 59
agency.
The scheme removes the government from the business of making
grants and having to take direct responsibility for the consequences
of the grants.
By their nature, tax incentives remove the
government's role in the particular choice or treatment of artistic
subject matter, yet encourage significant financial support for those
endeavors. The government will lose tax revenue, but will save in the
area of administrative overhead, which is no longer needed to run the

357. See EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, supranote 11, at 240 (suggesting that tax
exemption is second best alternative but that elimination of governmental subsidies altogether
where program lacks broad consensual support is preferable).
358. See HOPKINS, supra note 1, at 22-28 (outlining general tax regulations and policies
toward private donations to nonprofit organizations); ZEIGLER, supra note 3, at 186-92 (same).
359. The principal advantage is the relative insulation from critical review arising from policy
and administrative contact with the art projects. There is also an efficiency argument that
pushing project administrative functions down to the local level saves an extra layer of overhead.
See Stephen E. Weil, Tax Policy and Gitdng, in PUBLIC MONEY AND THE MUSE 153-81 (Stephen
Benedict ed., 1991) (addressing ways adjustments to federal tax code could act as incentive for
private giving to arts and humanities, including returning to pre-1986 method of calculating
deduction for gift of artwork valued over $5000 and allowing lower and middle income taxpayer
to deduct some multiple of cash given to charitable institutions).
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agency or the aspect of the agency that is no longer funded. In
effect, the scheme would channel resources more efficiently into arts
activities supported directly by the public's own initiative.
Opponents of government support to the arts in any form, however
indirect, can argue that offending art may still be produced under this
scheme. This argument against tax deductions to private nonprofit
arts organizations has yet to arise, although a debate over the
suitability of tax exemptions for certain arts-related projects could
arise. There already exists, however, an ancillary issue of governmental requirements to which an institution must conform before it, or
its donors, becomes eligible for tax benefits. For example, the IRS
refused to continue tax exemptions for Bob Jones University because
its policies on race were contrary to federal civil rights statutes. st
In effect, the IRS imposed a public purpose test to determine whether
a tax advantage would apply. These instances may be rare, but they
can be critical to the affected institution and its donors.
The principal basis for previous criticism of controversial arts
projects was the public's alleged distaste over federal allocation of
public funds for offensive work.361 A tax-based scheme avoids this
result by keeping the government out of the business of allocating
funds to the arts from public revenues. Indirect funding of non-profit
organizations has essentially been sanctioned by federal tax policy
since the enactment of the modem tax code in 1916,62 and has
remained untouched through far more prudish times and fashions
than those prevailing today."t
Other policy based arguments, however, can be raised against a tax
incentive scheme. There exists the assumption that tax induced
subsidies will uniformly follow the public will. One cannot assume,

360.

See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 461 U.S. 574, 581 (1983) (holding, on public policy

grounds, that IRS was within its authority to revoke tax exempt status of institution in violation
of federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, and that revocation was not in violation of institution's
freedom to exercise religion); see alsoJimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493
U.S. 378, 392 (1990) (holding California's imposition of tax liability on sale of religious materials
does not violate First Amendment freedom to exercise religion). NEA requires grantees to
assure compliance with federal civil rights law. See GUIDE, supra note 51, at 8 (explaining how
NEA operates and listing eligibility requirements for grant seekers).
361. See supra Part H.C. (discussing history of public outcry against NEA and calls for
revocation offunds for projects Perceived as racially, religiously, ethnically, orsexually offensive).
362.
363.

See26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3) (1994).
SeegeneraUy id. Section 501(c) (3), which exempts charities under the Internal Revenue

Code, has hardly been amended, and then only cosmetically, since the current Code's adoption
in 1954. Before that time, the exemption of charitable organizations from various forms of
taxation was routinely recognized and upheld in IRS statutes and regulations. See also Walz v.
Tax Comm'n of NewYork, 397 U.S. 664, 676-80 (1970) (discussing history of tax exemption for
religious and charitable organizations). See generaly Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 1 (discussing
British and American history of tax exemptions for charitable organizations).
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however, that individual donors with the means to take advantage of
the tax laws will have the same tastes and interests as the public as a
whole.
The fact that those people who allocate monetary resources to the
arts will see their contributions go where they want them is not
necessarily a bad result. In fact, this scheme is a perfectly fair
distribution of resources under the bargaining theory, which dictates
that private initiative should resolve demand in the absence of a
broad consensus. In this context, the most likely scenario is that
established arts organizations will benefit under a tax-based scheme
while less prominent or fledgling organizations will suffer. Because
the promotion of worthy new arts organizations, particularly in those
areas of the country that historically have lacked such services, is an
important function of the NEA, a tax-based scheme would appear selfdefeating to the goal of developing the arts on a national basis. Not
even well-established organizations would support such a result
because it is hardly in their own interest to do so. The tax-based
scheme also runs the risk of overlooking artistically worthy but
publicly unknown projects that might otherwise be recognized under
the current system. Presently, the government acts to promote
64
projects or types of art that hold great professional promise.
A tax-based scheme, therefore, cannot entirely replace a nationally
focused program that distributes its benefits in a consistent and fair
manner among the public at large, notwithstanding the advantages to
the government of withdrawing from controversial areas of arts
funding. A tax-based solution to federal support for the arts,
moreover, is an evasive approach to a problem that requires an
affirmative investment and direction at the national level. To resolve
the problem fully, a more sophisticated solution is required that
accounts for both national and local needs.
C. Continue the CurrentPractices
One obvious approach to the issue of federal funding to the arts is
to resolve its difficulties by the same congressional debate that has
taken place over the past thirty years. When complaints are raised
against a project or programmatic result of NBA funding, Congress
has responded by exercising its oversight power, resulting in appropriations to the NEA being reduced either generally or with regard to

364. For obvious reasons, privately donated money tends to flow to established organizations
that are familiar and artistically comfortable to the donor.
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specific aspects of its program that were the focus of the complaints."6 But to leave the process the way it is provides no solution
at all. The NEA would remain exposed to the same uncertainties it
faces today with respect to contentious accusations, negative publicity,
and a generally undeserved loss of stature. If the experience of such
political battles over the past five years is any indication, the prospect
of renewed calls for decency oaths and other content-based restrictions on the grant-making process is inevitable. As these restrictions
are likely to be invalidated upon judicial review, an impasse of sorts
would develop in which the NEA would be increasingly pitted against
its natural constituencies in the arts world.
As a point of First Amendment honor, it is difficult to concede
anything in the way of artistic freedom to the heckler's veto, or any
effort to stifle protected speech. Placing a relatively vulnerable
program in the unpleasant position of having to defend itself against
annual attack, which eventually may come to be viewed in all or
nothing terms, is also risky. Until recently, support for arts funding
has been enthusiastic, solid, and bipartisan. 6 Federal support to
the arts directly affects every state and congressional district. 67
With substantial changes in the new Congress' membership, such
support is likely to be reevaluated in a less friendly environment."'
The presumption of broad political support has to be reassessed and
bolstered by restructuring the NEA's operational methods to better
meet the complaints of its critics, as well as the long-established needs
of its constituents. In this sense, the status quo no longer suits the
NEA.
D. Reform Current NEA PracticesSelectively
A restructured NEA that emphasizes its most successful programs,
such as those that channel funds toward the support and promotion
of a national arts infrastructure, is the best solution to congressional
criticism and the most strategic use of the NEA's limited funding.
This type of approach would continue the principal thrust of the
NEA's work, which is to direct its largesse mostly to state and
municipal agencies, private institutions of professional stature, and

365. This was utilized during the 1989 and 1990 congressional debates over the NEA's
grant-making policies. On constitutional as well as artistic policy grounds, Kathleen M. Sullivan
has supported retaining the status quo ante. This is the majority view among constitutional
scholars and the arts community. Id. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Public Fundingand the Constitution,
in PUBLIC MONEY AND THE MUSE, supranote 359, at 80-95.
366. See INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 76, at 9-11.
367. See NEA, THE ARTS IN AMERICA, supranote 336, at II.
368. See supra note 330 (discussing wavering congressional opinions toward arts funding).

1995]

GOVERNMENT FUNDING TO THE ARTS

special initiatives in arts education. Programs that directly subsidize
individual artists would be phased out or shifted to state or local
control where community standards may be legitimately articulated
3 69
and considered in implementation decisions.
Likewise, disputes over First Amendment rights of artistic expression
are best exercised and defended in places where they have an actual
public impact. A decentralized decisionmaking process, especially
with respect to projects that tend to create controversy, would
properly place the issue of artistic freedom into the sphere of local
public debate where the effect of the expression is most immediately
felt rather than in the removed and artificial atmosphere of Washington, D.C. The enlightened administration or adjudication of such
controversies at the local level is bound to resolve the matter in a
more satisfactory manner to those immediately affected than by a
distant rumble over abstract principles in the nation's capital. The
NEA could protect itself against cases in which a court finds a funded
project's work obscene by including a basic contract provision in its
agreement with the grantee. The clause would provide that in such
situations all funding received by the project shall be returned to the
NEA along with attorney fees and costs associated with recovery. Such
a provision would greatly allay congressional and public concern that
NEA funding recipients are not subject to any meaningful oversight
of the results of their work. A provision of this type would also avoid
the constitutional difficulties of the "decency oath" provisions because
it operates retrospectively and leaves it to the courts, not the NEA, to
find a work obscene.'
The Independent Commission noted that
it was unable to find a single case in which an NEA-funded project
had been found to be judicially obscene."'
For its part, Congress would avoid some of the past rancor over
funding oversight by appropriating block-type grants to the states, still
subject to NEA general direction, and by narrowing the focus of other
arts funding to specific areas where substantial consensus exists.
Selectively and affirmatively targeting successful programs ensures
Congress that a broad consensus stands behind its arts funding. By
channeling federal support into the national arts infrastructure and

369. Jane Alexander, the current chairman of the NEA, recently ordered an end to all grants
to individual artists, and the funds shifted to state agencies. Kilian, supra note 335, at 3. A
provision in the 1995 Senate bill to re-authorize the NEA would formally ban any future grants
to most individuals and redirect more funds to cultural institutions. Jennifer Corbett &Janet
Hook, Senate Adopts Cuts in NEA Funding, 92-6, LA TIMES, Aug. 10, 1995, at A2.
370. See supra notes 308-22 and accompanying text (explaining that language of "decency
oaths" is generally vague and invites subjective interpretation by government officials).
371. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 76, at 84.
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by minimizing the NEA's funding for individual or idiosyncratic
projects, Congress could legitimately and effectively continue to fulfill
the mandate of the NEA's enabling legislation and nurture artistic
expression relatively free from official interference and unconstitutional restraint.
CONCLUSION

When Congress created the NEA, it expressed its will that a great
nation must be recognized for its achievements in the arts as well as
in science and technology. In order to flourish as a national
enterprise, the NEA was directed to promote the development of a
national arts policy. Over the past twenty-eight years, the NEA has
played a significant role in the expansion of the number of artists and
arts organizations that serve the public. At the same time, Congress
recognized that the role of the Federal Government should promote
and nurture the arts without the imposition of official styles and
tastes, and should protect the administration of the NEA from
political tampering. To a large degree, this approach has worked
smoothly and without controversy. Nevertheless, it was inevitable that
a small handful of projects would provoke controversy and require the
NEA and Congress to consider whether and what funding restrictions
might be necessary to avoid allegedly indecent or otherwise offensive
art.
By their nature, such regulations on government subsidies raise the
potential for unconstitutional restrictions on otherwise protected areas
of speech. The courts have consistently, if haltingly, found artistic
expression to be protected by the First Amendment in a manner not
unlike academic speech and that artistic expression properly belongs
in the same category as traditionally protected speech. In this sense,
art and artistic expression inhabits a traditional sphere of free
expression.
With regard to the degree to which government subsidies to
traditionally protected speech activities may condition the content or
viewpoint of the speech, it would seem clear that artistic expression,
like academic speech, occupies a special place within our constitutionaljurisprudence. Even though the government is under no constitutional obligation to support the arts, once it decides to fund a
protected activity, the recipient is free to pursue the project unencumbered by restrictions that would curtail its expressive content.
The Supreme Court's emphasis in Rust on the scope of the funded
program as the measure of the limit by which a funding regulation
may restrict the freedom of a recipient to speak remains problematic.
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The Court's reasoning leads to the conclusion that even within the
realm of a protected sphere of free expression, it is theoretically
possible that the government may so selectively define the funded
activity as to effectively eliminate all but one viewpoint on a given
subject matter. To the arts funding recipient, the prospect of such
congressional micro-management is troubling and unprecedented.
Yet, supporting the arts through a federal agency is ultimately a
political decision and will continue to be a political decision as to
whether to continue the NEA's mandate in the future.
Central to the NEA's original mandate was the preservation of the
autonomy of artists and arts organizations. Moreover, the NEA is
unique among arts agencies because it is the only organization that
is truly national in character and that takes as its ongoing charge the
nurture and development of the arts as it affects the entire population. As such, the NEA and all state and municipal governments that
support the arts serve the important function of bringing the benefits
of the arts to all segments of society. Consequently, the most effective
means of sustaining a broad consensus for federal leadership in the
arts is by emphasizing NEA programs and policies that have created
and sustained the foundation on which a substantial national arts
infrastructure now exists and which the arts require in order to
flourish. Because the NEA remains the single most important factor
in the development of a national arts infrastructure, its continued
functioning is essential.
Equally important is recognition of the constitutional principle that

the NEA and other arts organizations must be allowed administrative
breathing room to pursue the development of the arts unfettered by
restrictions on content and viewpoint. This Article discusses four
policy options for future government support to the arts: elimination

of all governmental funding, substitution of tax credits for direct
government grants, preservation of the status quo, and finally a more
selective policy of governmental funding to the arts. To accommodate
both the government's desire to protect the quality of the arts it
supports and artists' need to work freely, this Article proposes that the
government adopt the fourth option and selectively focus its funding
efforts on programs that nurture an arts infrastructure within which
organizations and artists may operate with maximum flexibility and

freedom. While this proposal leaves the government open to criticism
for indirectly supporting controversial projects that it once may have
supported directly, the proposal eliminates the government's burden
and responsibility to administer directly the individual work of the

artist. At the same time, it allows the government to fund directly
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those organizations and programs that are in the best position to
promote art, artists and their audiences.

